Seaways Free Article: The crew behind net zero
Remembering the humans who deliver safety and environmental protection at sea
by Aly Elsayed AFNI
As the maritime industry focuses on decarbonisation, it is vital to recognise the seafarers whose skills, workload, and resilience underpin every safe and environmentally responsible voyage. There are many questions around the transition to net zero, but one in particular needs to be asked more often: how much of the weight of that transition will be carried by seafarers?
The recent Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 84) session, held in London from 14–17 October 2025, wrapped up after several intense days of negotiations on the industry’s path toward decarbonisation – by deferring the final decision to next year. These discussions are vital and commendable, but it is important to remember that environmental protection is directly linked to the safety of ship operations. An environmentally responsible ship is, by definition, a safe one – and that means safe in all aspects.
What it means for workload
The introduction of the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP), particularly with the addition of Part III linked to the Carbon Intensity Indicator (CII), has brought a more structured and data-driven approach to improving energy performance across the industry. These measures have enhanced awareness of fuel efficiency and voyage optimisation, encouraging closer coordination between ship and shore. A World Maritime University (WMU) 2024 survey ‘Study on the Implementation of the IMO Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) Framework’, found that 40% of those surveyed believed that the introduction of SEEMP Parts II and III has resulted in shore staff becoming more engaged with energy management.
At the same time, these measures have noticeably increased the workload for both seafarers and shore-based personnel. On top of the already existing MARPOL Annex VI requirements, ships’ officers and engineers must now collect and record detailed data on fuel consumption, voyage parameters, and operational efficiency on a daily basis. While we may believe that new and highly automated systems will gather this data without effort being required, the reality is that poor data connection, poor integration of existing systems or poor user interface design and strict cybersecurity measures often require old-fashioned manual effort to gather, record and transmit the data – to say nothing of older vessels where this capability does not exist at all.
Masters and Chief Engineers adjust speed, trim, and power output to align with efficiency targets without compromising safety or schedule integrity. In addition, considerable time and effort are required to prepare for internal and external audits and verification processes related to the SEEMP and Carbon Intensity Indicator (CII) compliance. Just keeping up with the many new rules and the rapid evolution of regulations under MARPOL Annex VI is a challenge in itself. Ship inspectors report that multiple observations have been raised regarding incomplete or inconsistent SEEMP and CII compliance documentation. In several cases, Masters/Chief Engineers were found to be unaware of recent amendments or implementation requirements. Any subsequent corrective actions may extend over several days or weeks, adding further administrative and technical pressure on operational teams.
The picture is similar ashore, where technical and operational departments handle large volumes of operational data, maintain SEEMP documentation, and coordinate with commercial teams to ensure compliance and reporting accuracy. Many companies have established dedicated performance teams to manage these monitoring and reporting tasks, while others rely on third-party service providers for data analysis and verification support. However, not all companies do this, simply increasing the workload of existing staff as GHG reduction measures expand.
Another question emerges: will meeting these new technical and operational demands require more seafarers onboard – and more support ashore?
The case for more staff
Without sufficient crew to manage these additional duties, the risk is that compliance becomes a paper exercise, achieved at the cost of higher fatigue, reduced vigilance, and compromised safety. If the industry is serious about achieving net zero, it must also be serious about ensuring that the people on board have the ability, training, and time to make it happen.
Unfortunately, we know that the trend has historically been in the other direction. In many vessels today, important positions such as bosun, second cook, pumpman, carpenter and fitter have either been removed or are no longer treated as specialist roles that require additional skills and experience. Each of these roles carries responsibilities that go far beyond their titles. A pumpman, for example, has detailed knowledge of the cargo system, valves and transfer operations, experience that directly supports safety of operation and pollution prevention. A fitter or bosun plays a crucial role in achieving the ship’s maintenance plan, and their leadership and on-hand skills are often vital in day-to-day routine operations, especially when unexpected situations or repairs arise. As highlighted by an article in Liveseas (2023), even though modern ships may not always carry a dedicated fitter/welder, the role remains vital for maintenance, repair and dry-docking work that requires specific technical knowledge. In my view, the second cook was vital for supporting and maintaining the crew’s health, morale, and endurance during long voyages.
These are not minor functions but essential ones that keep the operation running safely and efficiently. When these roles are removed, their duties do not disappear. They are passed on to other crew members, often to less experienced or lower-ranked seafarers, who most of the time are on lower salaries and with less training. On paper, the ship may still meet the minimum safe manning requirement, but in reality, the standard of operation and safety margin are reduced.
The effect is especially visible among senior officers. Chief Officers and Second Engineers, who should be focused on planning, supervision of cargo, machinery, and safety oversight, are now standing with regular watches. On smaller and medium-sized vessels, Masters themselves are sometimes taking routine bridge watches, which leaves less time to manage navigation, compliance and crew welfare. The increased fatigue and workload are unsustainable and directly affect both safety and environmental performance.
The challenge is even greater when we look at the ageing global fleet. According to DNV’s Maritime Safety Trends 2014–2024, ships over 25 years old now account for around 41% of all recorded incidents, with machinery failures representing nearly 60% of those cases. Older ships demand more maintenance and technical attention – just the kind of specialist skills that are disappearing as manning levels fall.
Minimum Safe Manning
That brings us to the real issue of minimum safe manning. While the requirements for issuing a Minimum Safe Manning document are defined by the flag state in line with the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 and appropriate IMO Resolutions, in practice they often do not reflect the true operational reality on board.
We need to go further to ensure the manning requirements represent the actual operational needs of the specific trade each vessel is engaged in. One certificate cannot fit all. The same ship may require more crew during coastal or cargo preparation than for other periods within the same voyage; for example, short-sea passages will require more hands than long deep-sea passages.
Merely complying with the workinghours and rest-period rules is not enough to ensure safe operation; we need to build in enough redundancy to meet the real demands of the operation, ensuring that maintenance, port calls and emergencies can all be managed safely and effectively.
The Minimum Safe Manning document is not fixed permanently; it can be modified when there is a justified operational, technical, or trading change, subject to flag state approval. However, this flexibility only adds value if the process genuinely takes into account the operational workload, vessel condition, age, and – to bring us full circle – the safety responsibilities faced by those onboard.
Before we start thinking about introducing new rules, regulations, or pathways toward decarbonisation, we must first consider who will ultimately deliver them at sea. More training is not the whole answer. We need to recognise the reality of life onboard and the crew’s actual capacity to handle these growing demands. Sustainable progress depends on people as much as on policy. Without the right support for those who make it happen, no regulation will achieve its intended goal.
More than a paper exercise
The workload from implementing net zero requirements goes well beyond documentation. Monitoring energy efficiency indicators, adjusting propulsion parameters, managing engine load, conducting fuel sampling, and fulfilling optimisation requirements for verification all add layers of responsibility that must be carried out safely and consistently.
These adjustments also influence a ship’s manoeuvring behaviour, especially for existing ships, where design limitations and retrofit efficiency upgrades such as modified propellers may alter propulsion characteristics. For example, the use of engine power limiters can restrict available thrust during critical situations such as berthing a fully loaded ship, collision avoidance, or manoeuvring in adverse weather. This demands greater awareness, anticipation, and coordination from bridge and engine-room teams. Fuel quality and blended fuel issues have resurfaced along with the new efficiency and emission requirements, causing instability, compatibility problems, and machinery risks.
A clear example of this was given in the accident report summarised in MARS 202525. A 2024-built tanker was unberthing when the pilot requested ‘dead slow ahead’ (25 RPM), followed by ‘slow ahead’ (30–37 RPM). However, the main engine did not respond beyond 25 RPM. The Chief Engineer explained that the engine-control computer prevented any further power increase because funnel emissions were ‘too high.’ The system’s automated safeguard could not be overridden, effectively restricting the vessel’s propulsion during a critical manoeuvre.
Although the vessel ultimately cleared the berth safely, the incident clearly demonstrates how new systems can introduce constraints on traditional ship-handling capability. It underscores the key lesson that new technology can introduce unintended consequences – and that crew need to develop and maintain a thorough understanding of the abnormalities of each device or system. Additional work is needed not just to use the new tools, but to understand their failure modes and the override logic (if available), and when to use it. At the same time, crew must retain the vital old skills of visual judgement, manual control and contingency planning.