200423 Unsafe Speed in Congested Area
Unsafe Speed in Congested Area
MARS Report 200423
After sailing from Port Kelang, Malaysia, and joining westbound lane of the Malacca Strait TSS, my 2,824 TEU container vessel proceeded on maneuvering speed and with manned machinery space towards One Fathom Bank. It was early morning, with the 2nd. mate on watch but following my experience and good seamanship practice, I decided to remain on the bridge and not to commence sea passage until passing One Fathom Bank shoal.
Ahead of my vessel was a VLCC in ballast, heading NW with the speed of 15.5 kts. Due to having calculated the CPA in the vicinity of the narrowest part of the TSS, my vessel was keeping a safe speed in order to give way to the VLCC. Behind my vessel, also heading NW, was a rapidly closing post-panamax container vessel with the speed of over 26 knots. Bearing in mind how dangerous it is to keep the vessel on full sea speed in such traffic condition, I was thinking that she would reduce her speed or to take some another kind of action in order to avoid a close quarters situation. However, nothing happened, no action taken by the post-panamax container vessel. She was keeping full sea speed of over 26 knots and she was heading in between the two ships ahead of her with CPA of zero.
When the situation become too serious and when it was quite clear that fully laden container vessel was not aware how serious the situation was, I gave the order to alter the course to port, even to cross border of the TSS and to enter into the opposite lane. She was not responding to calls from the VTS. The only action taken was, in the very last moment, sounding her whistle and desperately calling on VHF Ch.16/88, something like: " tanker vessel ahead of me, tanker vessel ahead of me. . . "
Most probably the OOW on board the fast container vessel was thinking that my vessel was a tanker because we had a dangerous cargo light on. She passed "safely" with less then 100m in between the two vessels. The OOW on board the container vessel was most probably not sufficiently experienced to be able to manoeuvre such a large ship at such high speed in a narrow channel and close to shallow waters. The absence of the captain on the bridge was evident. The plotting of vessels in the vicinity on the bridge of the container vessel was wrong and the COLREGS were not followed.
Readers Feedback
1
The Master submitting this report suggests that his container vessel may have been mistaken for a tanker "because we had a dangerous cargo light on". I would be intrigued to learn under what authority and for what purpose a container ship displays this signal when under way.
2
I am frequently dismayed at some of the reports sent into MARS that complain about the manoeuvres of others not observing good seamanship and not following the rules, when in fact the actions of those making the report are questionable at best.
MARS 200423 is a good example of this. Own ship quite rightly in my opinion had her engine ready for manoeuvre, but, does not appear to have had any intention to use it. Overtaking the VLCC in a narrow part of the lane could have easily been avoided by reducing speed. This would have also given the overtaking container vessel more space to overtake if she so wished. Although the report does not say what, if any, traffic was in the other lane, the alteration to port into the other lane was a dangerous departure from the rules. Situations like this could easily be avoided with a little forward thinking and dealing with situations early before they develop into near miss situations.
Another point in this report is that own ship is displaying, what he refers to as a "dangerous cargo light". This in itself is a clear violation of rule 20(b). What is the purpose of telling other vessels that you have dangerous cargo on board? Having dangerous cargo on board does not alter the fact that you are a "power driven vessel" and still fully obliged to comply with the rules.