200106 Risk of Explosion

Risk of Explosion
Report No. 200106

The vessel had loaded nine hatches with coal. After departure it was decided to fit tapes on top of the hatch covers as per the charterers instructions. The Bosun and the crew were familiar with the sticking procedures of the tape but, as it was a cold day, the Chief Officer told the crew that it might be necessary to warm it up a bit if it did not adhere well to the hatch cover. Before knocking off he suggested that they dip the tape in a bucket of hot water for a few minutes immediately before using it. After giving this advice he specifically instructed them not to use any other means of heat, which would involve open fire on deck, such as a blow lamp.

Later in the absence of the Chief Officer, the Master suggested to the Bosun that the tape could be heated with a blow lamp prior to applying on the cover. The crew, equipped with a burning blow lamp, then set out to fit the Ramnek tapes beginning with #1 hatch covers. They started off to fit it from the after end of #1 hatch. Fortunately, this did not work and after a short while the job had to be abandoned. The tape was fitted afterwards without the use of heat. The hatches were well known to leak and the vessel has been extremely lucky to have missed an explosion and disaster. It clearly proved that the personnel right from the Captain to the crew had absolutely no idea of the hazards associated with the carriage of coal.

The incident was discussed in great detail at a subsequent safety meeting. The hazards associated with the carriage of coal with particular reference to the danger of explosion and its consequences were emphasised. The Captain and the five men involved were not to blame, they did not think that they were doing anything wrong. It just goes to prove that they were not taught about the danger of explosion and not aware of the consequences. The only way to prevent such incidents is through proper education. A permit must be obtained for "hot work" on deck and permission obtained from a responsible Officer during the carriage of coal.

When I did a hose test prior to the next load, it became clear to me that all the hatch covers were not weathertight and that some had a gap of 1cm or more along the centre line. Coal gas monitoring during the passage indicated the methane levels in excess of 100% LEL. Clearly we were saved from a potential disaster. Although a near-miss report was made immediately after the incident, the Captain refused to send it to the office. Worse still, the Captain, up to the time when I signed off, still did not appreciate the seriousness of the incident.