98023 Master's Authority questioned

It is fashionable now to contest the master's authority, implying that more courses are needed ashore to show these stupid masters how they have to run their ship. It is not enough that they are reduced to check list filing clerks by the first poor implementation of the ISM Code. Almost everybody ashore has an idea about how the master should act, unfortunately nobody is ready to share his responsibilities. His scapegoat status remains unchanged.

Lloyd's List recently published several articles on the issue. After reading these, I would proclaim three cheers for Lord Donaldson who is reported to have said that having masters who were also owners of the vessel provide the necessary shot in the arm to safe navigation and proper maintenance. I cannot agree with the other exacerbated attack on master's authority regarding the bridge management resource. It is easy to point out to the experienced masters who were involved in some accidents, but nothing is said about the safety record of these masters. Furthermore, many accidents occur to unexperienced masters or when no master is on the bridge. One master has already suggested that an accident occurred partly because the master's authority was questioned by the chief engineer.

It is true that the master must listen to all the suggestions or warnings presented by his staff and all masters who are worth their salt are doing so.. In my standard instruction to officers, I include a paragraph requiring them to communicate anything that concerns them, particularly regarding navigation issues. It is also true that the master is subject to various forms of pressure. Instead of being deprived of his authority, he should see it reinforced in order to be able to resist this pressure. Tragically, just the reverse is happening. There have been a lot more seafarers' lives lost on bulk carriers which have been certified seaworthy by Classification Societies, Port State Control, naval architects and many others, than after accidents involving a lack of team work on the bridge. After being subjected to harassment for trifle deficiencies by Port State Control, the master is still expected to take a bulk carrier out of port and encounter many chances for his ship to founder if caught in a typhoon. I searched the Web for information on the MINERAL DIAMOND sinking and could find almost nothing about the possible causes of the loss apart from a lot of contradictory information about the weather conditions and some well thought out considerations exonerating the stevedores for any negligence.

Some want to share the master's power for decision making, good, let them also share his responsibilities and the penalties incurred when incidents occur. It will never be possible in practice for this to happen. The shore based shipping experts are paid to give counsel, to train, to instruct, to request, to inspect, to survey, to judge, to arbitrate or to punish but never to share any burden of the master, even less the fate of his ship.

Some MARS reports have been published where the OOW seeks to denigrate the master without the latter having any right to reply or the means to defend himself if he is not a member of the NI. Such reports should be treated with the utmost caution. There are masters who do not deserve their title but this should be assessed by the peers and not a one sided declaration that they are incompetent. I will now play the lawyer of the accused and examine in detail a few points from these reports.

Regarding MARS 970037, perhaps the master was asking questions to test the OOW's knowledge:

• What is that button on the radar? – The master can be new to the ship and not yet familiar with the radar. Who knows? Some buttons are seldom or never used, some others are better not used at all.
• What is the meaning of PAN PAN? – O.K. he should know but a new guy coming out of the GMDSS course knows all about it.
• Where is Sudan? – Again he should know. If he had been there he would never forget it.
• His failure to recognise the questionable steering ability of an AB – I admit this is a sin but what do we know about the ability of the OOW to recognise steering ability of an A.B.
• Occasionally bringing a glass of whisky to the bridge – big mistake, he should keep his best whisky for all the visitors in the next port.
• Not closer than 12nm off the coast, that route was about 50nm longer than I would have thought – First of all, if the master wanted to avoid any risk of running aground, that is his choice and should not be criticised by any officer. He may also want to avoid the many fishing boats near Mauritania. Second, I do not accept the 50 extra miles. From Finisterre to Recife, the straight rhumb line goes through the Canary Islands and Cape Verde Islands. An extremely safer route would take the ship west of Madeira and the Cape Verde Islands. I quickly put the respective way points in a dbase program I prepared for this purpose, this safer route involves only 3 miles more.

 

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The second report was MARS 97038 which involved a close quarters situation between a passenger-cargo vessel and a naval vessel. This was a strange story indeed but again, little is known about the details of the incidents and the motivation of the captain. However, navy ships have the most unpredictable reactions of all the craft we meet. Luckily we do not meet them very often.

 

They often comply to the logic of a military exercise, their officers seldom have an extensive experience of heavy traffic and their engine can easily be stopped and reversed, although, I admit, this is not an argument regarding the COLREGS.

Not so long ago, I experienced a reverse situation Some hundred miles off Norfolk, we were called as per our co-ordinates by an aircraft carrier ordering us to steer 90 degrees to the left of our actual course in order not to impede his aircraft landing operations. There was not one ship to be seen on the horizon or on the radar. However, I knew that these naval vessels had powerful radar systems (and our brand new main radar was already out of order. We complied with the order in spite of the risk of losing the convoy in Panama but I wonder how far away the aircraft carrier was.