202344 - Collision in daylight and good visibility, take 2

A bulk carrier in ballast was underway in daylight conditions and good visibility. Near noon, there was a handover of the watch. The helm was on autopilot and the vessel’s speed was 14.8 knots.

As edited from NTSB (USA) report MIR-23-09

Since it was daylight and good visibility, the OOW was alone on the bridge while the helmsman/lookout was occupied with other ship duties on deck. Meanwhile, on the bridge of an offshore supply vessel (OSV) about 8nm away, the OOW was also alone. Although ostensibly navigating, he was also occupied with various personal calls and text messages on his mobile phone.

According to the Voyage Data Recorders (VDRs) of both vessels, each vessel was present on the other’s ARPA display, both as a radar and AIS target. Neither radar had any automatic target tracking or alarm features enabled, and neither vessel was acquired by either OOW. The vessels were in a crossing situation with a CPA of zero.

Eventually, the OOW on the OSV became aware of the risk of collision. He disengaged the autopilot, increased the throttles and turned to port to minimise the damage to the vessel as a collision was now inevitable. The bulbous bow of the bulk carrier, which was traveling at about 14 knots, struck the port side of the OSV, which was traveling at 9 knots, and breached the hull. The impact caused the OSV to heel to starboard, and water rushed over the main deck from the starboard side. At the time of the collision, the bulk carrier was still in autopilot mode, and there was no recorded change of engine telegraph (which was still at full ahead) or rudder order. About 18 seconds after impact, the OOW engaged manual steering and turned the rudder hard to port. About 30 seconds after impact, the Master of the bulk carrier arrived on the bridge.

The general alarm was sounded on the OSV, and all crew were instructed to go to their muster stations. As a consequence of the collision the port side propulsion room started to flood, and the OSV began to list to port and trim by the stern. The ship’s ballast pump was used to dewater the space and to get the breach to the hull out of the water as far as possible. Although the OSV lost propulsion, the electrical generators in the engine room remained operational and provided power to the ship. Damage to both vessels was estimated at $12.3 million.

 

The official investigation found that the probable cause of the collision between the bulk carrier and the OSV was distraction of the bulk carrier’s OOW due to performing non-navigational tasks and distraction of the OOW on the OSV due to cell phone use, which kept both officers from keeping a proper lookout. Contributing to the casualty was the OOW on the OSV not following his company’s watchkeeping policies, which called for two persons on the bridge at all times.

Lessons learned

• Nonoperational use of cell phones and other wireless electronic devices by on-duty crewmembers in safety-critical positions has been a factor in casualties and accidents in all transportation modes. Using cell phones and other personal electronic devices has been demonstrated to be visually, manually, and cognitively distracting.
• Nonoperational use of cell phones should never interfere with the primary task of a watchstander or a bridge team member to maintain a proper lookout. It is important for personnel to follow established protocols regarding cell phone use
•