95100 Official Report: Engine Room Fire

Official Report: Engine Room Fire
English Channel

Report No. OR02

The UKMAIB Official Report into an engine room fireon the ferry SALLY STAR is an important report as such incidents can easilyoccur, I therefore reproduce a précis of that report. The reportis published by the MAIB, 5/7 Brunswick Place, Southampton UK SO15 2AN.
SUMMARY

On 25 August 1994, mv SALLY STAR, a Bahamian Registered Ro-Ro passengerferry was en route to Ramsgate from Dunkirk and in a position about 6.5miles east of Ramsgate when fire broke out in the main engine room. Thefire was caused by the failure of a bolted flange joint on the low pressurefuel system to No 4 main engine, allowing flammable fuel oil vapour to comeinto contact with part of the engine exhaust system. Initial attempts toextinguish the fire were unsuccessful, mainly due to failure of the auxiliarygenerators and the emergency fire pump and despite the injection of Halongas into the space. However, the closure of the engine room ventilationand fuel oil systems effectively starved the fire of fuel and oxygen. Thefire was finally reported as extinguished about three hours from the onsetof the emergency.

The incident required the co-ordinating role of HM Coastguard Dover,off-shore fire fighting teams from Kent Fire Brigade, RAF and HM Coastguardhelicopters. A total of 85 non-essential crew and 17 passengers were transferredashore by RNLI lifeboats based at Ramsgate and Margate. Tugs and other vesselsstood by the SALLY STAR which was finally towed to Dunkirk for repairs.One crew member suffered an injury during fire fighting operations and wasevacuated ashore by helicopter.

FINDINGS

1. The immediate cause of the fire was ignition of fuel oil and vapourleaking from a failed flange on the low pressure fuel system to No 4 mainengine, coming into contact with a hot surface which was most probably thatof an exhaust pipe.

 

2. Contributing factors which influenced the severity of the fire were:

i. the failure of covers serving the engine mounted components of thelow pressure fuel system to contain the discharge of fuel oil from the failedflange

ii. the failure of the auxiliary generators, leading to the loss of twoof the vessel's fire pumps

iii. the failure of the emergency fire pump, due to the loss of powerfrom the emergency switchboard

iv. the loss of the Halon extinguishing gas due to leakage past mainengine room flaps and access hatch

OTHER FINDINGS

3. Halon was discharged into the main engine room 33 minutes after thealarm was raised, and after one Halon bottle had discharged prematurelydue to overheating.

4. The general alarm could not be rung continuously without attendance.

5. The Public Address system was not used fully due to the loss of thecall tone falsely indicating a defect.

6. The quantity of Halon gas specified to be injected into the main engineroom did not take account of the possible discharge of air into the spacefrom the air receivers positioned in the compressor room. Discharge of airfrom this system may have diluted the Halon concentration, but not necessarilybelow the concentration required by regulation.

7. Lifeboats were deployed for embarkation, however they were not used,and non-essential crew and passengers were evacuated using an escape routeacross the vehicle deck onto other surface vessels.

8. An accurate figure for the number of Kent Fire Brigade personnel onboard SALLY STAR was not known to HM Coastguard at all stages during theincident.

9. The fire protection insulation on the divisions surrounding the mainengine room proved to be effective in preventing fire spreading to otherspaces.

10. The emergency lighting in the accommodation was not fully effectivedue to defective bulbs, probably as a consequence of lack of identificationon emergency light fittings.

11. A cross connection valve between the fuel systems for the main enginesand auxiliary engines was not closed when the quick closing valves servingthe main engines were closed. Instructions on the vessel indicated thatthis valve should have been closed in an emergency.

12. Communications with, and control of, the ship's breathing apparatusteams fighting the fire were not sufficiently disciplined and contributedto the delay in discharging the Halon into the main engine room.

13. The joint training exercises between Sally Line staff, HM Coastguard,Kent Fire Brigade, the RAF and others contributed to the ultimate successof this operation.

Following the incident Sally Line initiated a number of remedial actions.These are:

* The flanges on the low pressure fuel rails and associated pipes tothe main engines have been modified from two bolt to four bolt flanges.

* The main engine hot box covers securing arrangements have been restored.Inspection procedures have been changed to daily rather than "at everystart up " procedure.

* Emergency quick closing valves operated remotely from the machinerycontrol room have been fitted to the fuel rail on each main engine and auxiliarydiesel generator.

* Fuel leakage alarms have been fitted to the forward and aft ends ofeach hot box of each main engine.

* The power supply for the call tone of the Public Address system hasbeen connected to the emergency battery system.

* Changes have been made to the electrical supply arrangements and pipingsystems of the auxiliary generator cooling system.

* Additional Halon and air supply flaps have been incorporated in theengine room ventilation system.

* Halon flaps in the main engine room have been fitted with stiffeners.

* "Red Dot" markers have been placed on emergency light fittings.

* The steering gear control cables have been re-routed away from themain engine room.

* The general alarm has been made capable of continuous unattended operation.

* A formal testing and recording procedure for the emergency generatorhas been put in place.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Sally Line is recommended to:

i. Amplify the shipboard instructions for the closing of quick closingvalve V79 in an emergency.

ii. Address the problem of personnel not being able to distinguish betweenpassengers and crew in the event of an emergency.

iii. Introduce further on-board exercises undertaken by the ship's staffwhich include procedures designed to enhance the efficiency and controlof breathing apparatus teams.

iv. Reconsider the practice of allowing the watchkeeping engineer toperform maintenance tasks which require him to be absent from the machinerycontrol room, or immediate adjacent spaces, for long periods.

v. Consider pressure testing the main engine room space to assess itsgas retaining ability.

The MAIB also made recommendations in the reportto Kent Fire Brigade and to HM Coastguard and the Marine Safety Agency.The MSA were recommended to give consideration to undertaking a researchprogramme to establish whether there is a need to introduce clearer or morestringent requirements for low pressure fuel systems of medium speed dieselengines to assure that the fuel supply pipes can withstand expected peakpressures in service. Also to give consideration to investigating the advisabilityand feasibility of incorporating vapour detectors as part of fire detectionsystems for use in Category A machinery spaces.