98060 BRIGHT FIELD Allision

BRIGHT FIELD Allision
USA Official Report

The following is a synopsis of a report made by the NTSB into a serious accident where main engine failure at a critical point was a factor in the allision of the Chinese manned bulk carrier BRIGHT FIELD with the wharf adjacent to a busy part of New Orleans waterfront. The complete report can be obtained from: National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161, USA or from the Web Site http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/1998/MAR9801.pdf
Executive Summary

Shortly after 1400 on December 14 1996, the fully loaded Liberian bulk carrier BRIGHT FIELD temporarily lost propulsion power as the vessel was navigating outbound in the Lower Mississippi River at New Orleans, Louisiana. The vessel struck a wharf adjacent to a populated commercial area that included a shopping mall, a condominium parking garage and a hotel. No fatalities resulted from the accident and no one aboard the BRIGHT FIELD was injured; however, 4 serious injuries and 58 minor injuries were sustained during the evacuation of shore facilities, a gaming vessel and an excursion vessel located near the impact area. Total property damages to the BRIGHT FIELD and to shoreside facilities were estimated at about $20 million.

The National Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of Clearsky Shipping Company to adequately manage and oversee the maintenance of the engineering plant aboard the BRIGHT FIELD, with the result that the vessel temporarily lost power while navigating in a high risk area of the Mississippi River. Contributing to the amount of property damage and the number and types of injuries sustained during the accident was the failure of the US Coastguard, the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans and the International RiverCenter to adequately assess, manage, or mitigate the risks associated with locating unprotected commercial enterprises in areas vulnerable to vessel strikes.

The major safety issues identified in this investigation are the adequacy of the ship's main engine and automation systems, the emergency preparedness and evacuation plans of vessels moored in the Poydras Street wharf area and the adequacy of port risk assessment for activities within the Port of New Orleans. The report also addresses three other issues: the actions of the pilot and crew during the emergency, the lack of effective communication (as it relates to the actions of the pilot and crew aboard the BRIGHT FIELD on the day of the accident) and the delay in administering toxicological tests to the vessel's crew.

Investigation

According to vessel records, the engineering plant had a history of problems and on the previous voyage a 3 day layover in Singapore was necessary while repairs were made to the main engine and several interruptions occurred to the voyage with continuing problems after these repairs had been carried out.

The vessel left the loading berth at Cargill Terminal on December 11th 1996 and moved to the lower portion of La Place Anchorage where it remained at anchor for two days while scheduled repairs were made to the main engine's turbocharger and air cooler. On December the 14th the pilot boarded the BRIGHT FIELD at 1040 and was escorted to the bridge where he was introduced to the master. The ship's master spoke what the pilot described as broken, but adequate, English. The pilot said that, to facilitate communication, he spoke slowly and used simple words, and he believed that he and the master understood each other. The master also said that he was satisfied with their ability to communicate.

At 1055, the pilot began the normal procedures for getting underway by ordering the first engineering manoeuvring bell (dead slow ahead). The main engine did not start from the engine wheelhouse controls. The 3/O called the engine control room and told the chief engineer, in Chinese, that the engine did not start. Engine control was transferred to the engine control room. After the engines were started, engine control was transferred back to the wheelhouse. The pilot ordered stop engine and the engine was stopped. At 1110, the pilot ordered dead slow ahead. Again, the engine could not be started from the wheelhouse, and again control was transferred to the engine control room, from which the engine was restarted. After the accident, the pilot stated that he had not been advised of the difficulties in starting the engine from the wheelhouse, nor was he informed on those occasions when engine control was transferred to or from the engine control room.

The BRIGHT FIELD departed the La Place Anchorage at 1112. Engine manoeuvring control was transferred back to the wheelhouse and the pilot ordered full ahead manoeuvring speed in order to familiarise himself with the ship's responsiveness to rudder and engine orders (which he found as expected for a fully loaded bulk cargo vessel operating in high-river-stage conditions). At 1134, the pilot ordered sea speed. About 1300, at the pilots request, the ship's carpenter was sent with a hand-held radio, to stand by the anchors.

At about 1350, the pilot made the first radio call to the U.S. Coast Guard Gretna light operator. The Gretna light operator advised the BRIGHT FIELD that the ship was cleared to transit Algiers Point and that a seagoing tow boat was inbound at that point. The pilot stated that, while the BRIGHT FIELD was transiting under the Crescent City Connection Bridges, he allowed the vessel to acquire a current-induced swing to port to facilitate the upcoming manoeuvre around Algiers Point.

The swing to port as the ship passed under the Crescent City Connection Bridges pointed the vessel toward the left descending bank, the side of the river where Poydras Street wharf and Riverwalk Marketplace shopping mall were located and where gaming, excursion and cruise ships docked. At about 1406, while the BRIGHT FILED was still transiting under the bridges, power output from the vessel's main engine dropped. At this time, the vessel's automated propulsion control system reported low main engine lubricating oil pressure and main engine trip due to low oil pressure.

The pilot noticed the sudden quiet and the vibration ceasing. He turned and saw the master and 2/O standing beside the engine order telegraph looking down at something on the console and asked them if there was a problem but got no response. He said that he did not ask a second time "because they didn't answer me the first time". He then saw that the engine rpm had dropped to about 30. When he realised that the vessel had lost power, the pilot "jumped" out of his chair and called the Governor Nicholls Light operator. As he made the call he was looking out of the bridge windows and was aware that the ship was swinging to port and toward the docked ships along the left descending bank. The pilot told the Governor Nicholls Light operator that his ship had lost power and that the operator should alert everyone in the harbour. He then ordered hard starboard rudder as the ship continued to swing to port but the new rudder setting did nothing to alter the vessel's direction and the pilot began sounding the danger signal using the ship's forward whistle. He wanted to attract the attention of the cruise ships and the public along the bank. The pilot stated that he ordered the master on at least two occasions to have someone stand by the anchors but he did not hear the master acknowledge the order. He recalled the master speaking Chinese on the radio and that the master did not appear to be agitated.
The chief engineer and the second mate had meanwhile been talking on the telephone. The chief engineer told the 2/O that he did not know the reason for the sudden drop in No. 1 oil pump pressure but since the No. 2 pump had already come on line, the pressurisation problem was solved. The chief engineer and the 2/O mutually agreed to transfer engine control to the engine control room and the chief engineer began the process of restoring engine power. The pilot was not made aware of the restoration of power. The swing to port continued and the pilot ordered the master to drop anchors and ordered the main engine full astern. The master said the pilot ordered only the port anchor to be dropped, that he concurred with that order, and that, although he did not acknowledge the order to the pilot, he attempted to carry it out. The master said that he attempted to call the carpenter on the foc's'le using the hand-held radio. The carpenter, who was standing by the anchors, said that he could not hear the radio transmissions from the master because the danger signal was being sounded on the ship's whistle which was located about 20 feet above his station on the bow. The master stated that he rushed out to the port bridge wing and waved his arms to attract the carpenter's attention. When he realised that the carpenter did not see him, the master went back inside the bridge. Once back inside, intermittent communications were established between the master and the carpenter. By the time reliable communication was established, the ship had moved farther toward the wharf and the master believed that dropping the anchor at that time would cause the ship to take a sharp turn to the left and perhaps strike one of the vessels docked there. He said he therefore told the carpenter not to drop the anchor. The master said that after the ship had moved a little farther, he again contacted the carpenter and told him to drop the anchor to keep the ship from striking the docked vessels. The carpenter said that he turned the brake wheel to let go of the port anchor and then ran from the bow to avoid being injured in the imminent allision. Post accident review of an amateur videotape of the allision indicated that the anchor did not drop prior to impact.

At about 1411, the port bow of the BRIGHT FIELD struck the Poydras Street wharf at a location between the docked NIEUW AMSTERDAM and THE QUEEN OF ORLEANS. The vessel struck the wharf at what witnesses said was a 40- to 45- degree angle went into the wharf up to the end of the foc's'le deck (about 50 to 60 feet), and then made a sideways movement. The bow portion of the vessel scraped and collapsed portions of the buildings. The ship came to rest against the wharf with its stern about 200 feet from the stern of the NIEUW AMSTERDAM and its bow about 70 feet from the bow of THE QUEEN OF ORLEANS. About 3 minutes had elapsed from the time the pilot made his first emergency call to the Coast Guard light operator until the ship struck the wharf.