98031 Dire Straits
Dire Straits
Report No. 98031
The Strait of Gibraltar is one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. Every year, around 54,000 merchant vessels pass through the Strait and 28,000 ferries and high speed craft cross the Strait from Algeciras to Ceuta and Tangiers. There is also a significant presence of fishing vessels and pleasure craft. More often than not, dangerous situations develop between ships navigating from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic and those coming from the Atlantic and bound for Algerciras, the refinery and Gibraltar itself. Vessels transiting the Strait are requested by virtue of IMO Resolution MSC 63/67, which entered into force on 03 June 1997, to report to the Traffic Control Centre on VHF Channel 10.
Two examples of the high number of close quarters situations follow, one of these resulted in a collision. The other was a near miss which occurred in almost identical circumstances and position. In both cases it was found that there was:
a) A lack of an efficient lookout and aural watch on channels 16 or 10 on board one or both of the vessels.
b) No traffic in the vicinity to influence or upset the decision to avoid collision or a close quarter situation.
In the case of the collision there was minor damage to the hull and super - structures but no personnel injuries and no pollution was caused. The visibility at the time of the incident was less than 1 mile. Vessel "X" was a chemical tanker proceeding on a course of about 2530T at a speed of 11.4 knots. Vessel "Y" was a bulk carrier and after clearing the TSS made a series of small course alterations to port ending up, just before the collision, on a course of 0090T at a speed of 11 knots. These small alterations of course may well not have been detected by vessel "A" and, in any case, it was not until 4 or 5 minutes before the collision that the CPA was unacceptable or the collision evident. Before the collision, the vessels were not identified to the Traffic Control Centre and, at the time, this was not compulsory.
Calls from the Centre to both vessels were not answered.
Although it may not have had any bearing on the incident, at the time of the collision an "important" World Cup soccer match was being shown on TV.
In the second case, a close quarter situation developed but a collision was avoided by the action of the stand-on vessel. Vessel "A" was a cargo ro-ro vessel on a course of 2560T at a speed of 8.5 knots. Vessel "B" was a bulk carrier in ballast on a course of 0090T at 12 knots. According to vessel "A", the bearing of vessel "B" did not change.
The incident occurred at approximately 0400 in good visibility. At 0355, when the two vessels had closed to 1 mile, vessel "A" made 5 short blasts on the whistle and 5 flashes by searchlight towards vessel "B". The give-way vessel "B" did not answer to the signals by whistle or searchlight or take any action. At 0.6 miles, vessel "A" sounded one short blast and took a complete turn to starboard to avoid a collision. The course alteration to port made by vessel "B" after clearing the TSS was made without any consideration for vessel "A". It would have been much easier, convenient and normal for vessel "B" to leave vessel "A" fine on her port bow until it was clear to pass round her stern and then proceed into Gibraltar port.