97036 The Failings of GMDSS and VHF

The Failings of GMDSS and VHF
Report No. 97036

I agree wholeheartedly with the writer of MARS 96029 and can confirm his experiences with regard to countless error messages and many being received from two oceans away. There is also so much abuse of VHF. It is unnecessary to repeat here all the garbage and foul language one hears on that frequency. I only hope that I won't have to depend on either of these means of communication when I find myself in a distress situation and obliged to transmit a distress message.

The following is a summary of an Official Report by the Bahamas Maritime Authority which was published in the Institute of Marine Engineers Journal in March 1997. The case study was prompted by a member of the IME whose best friend, the Chief Engineer, was killed during a fire on board the general cargo vessel "Borrenmill". He suggested that the journal follow up the cause of the tragedy and identify what, if anything, could be learned for the benefit of all. It is reproduced hear with the same objective.

An investigation into an accommodation fire by the Bahamas Maritime Authority concluded that the seat of the fire was within a small cloakroom locker used by the Officers' Steward for storing cleaning materials and located at the top of the stairwell on "D" deck. However, the source of the ignition could not be established with certainty.

In the early hours, a fire patrolman sighted smoke from the locker. The door was opened, flames leapt out and the patrolman retreated to the bridge to warn the Navigating Officer without closing the door. The general alarm was activated, the Master awoke and noticed that his office was filling with smoke. On leaving his office, he saw flames rising from the stairwell around the engine room casing. The inside route to the bridge was inaccessible so the Master left the accommodation via the port aft door and went to the bridge from outside.

Once there, he re-activated the alarm which had not been locked on. Engine Room and accommodation fans were stopped and "Stop Engines" rang on the telegraph. Crew members gathered to fight the fire while the Chief Navigating Officer rang the Master from his cabin to seek advice on how to escape the fire. He was advised to escape through the starboard aft accommodation door. That was the last the Master heard from him. Meanwhile, the absence of the Chief Engineer and the Radio Officer was noted.

Within a short time the fire had spread rapidly and the order was given to turn out the lifeboats. The bridge was enveloped in smoke, the Master and two others were trapped on the port bridge wing. The two escaped via a fire hose to the boat deck but the Master was preparing to jump when a fireball exploded in the wheelhouse, blowing him overboard. He managed to reach a lifeboat. Meantime four crewmen were fighting the fire when the fire pump control panel burned out stopping the pump. The Electrician re-started it from the Engine Room by shorting the contacts. The Engine Room was inspected and the lagging on the generators found to be smouldering. This was successfully extinguished with a portable unit.

The fire was becoming manageable and those in the lifeboat rejoined the ship to help fight it. During the damping down operations the bodies of the Chief Navigating Officer and the Radio Officer were found. The fire was finally brought under control that evening. Assistance arrived late afternoon the next day and a medical team from the USS Ponce arrived the following day. The medics discovered the remains of the Chief Engineer underneath debris in his cabin.

The investigating team found the linings of the cleaning locker reduced to ashes and damage to the contents suggested that this was the origin of the fire which had smouldered some time before discovery. The locker was likely to have contained floor stripper and polish, cleaning cloths, paper garbage sacks etc. It also contained a paper sack with garbage from the Officers' smoke room. The rapid spread of the fire was due to the open plan design of the ship's accommodation, lack of fire doors between decks, delay in shutting off the accommodation fans and the combustible coatings on the bulkheads and deckheads.

The report suggests that the alarm should have been raised by the fire patrol rating and the fire party mustered before the door to the cleaning room was opened. There was no smoke or heat detection system or break glass points in the accommodation. The general alarm was not sounded effectively and the accommodation fans not shut down until the Master arrived on the bridge. This delay allowed the fire to take hold. The report also suggests that some people on D, E and F decks did not hear the alarm due to fire damaging the wiring.

The report makes a number of recommendations including that the stowing of garbage in a locker containing cleaning chemicals should be prohibited. The vessel complied with all the requirements but had no means of raising the alarm from within the main accommodation. The design of the alarm button should be such that it does not require to be pushed, twisted and locked in to continue sounding.

The fact that the Chief Navigating Officer had to ask for an escape route was of some concern. The report notes that the Chief Engineer's, Chief Officer's and Radio Officer's cabins had opening windows either forward or to the outboard side of the accommodation that could have led them to safety had they heard the alarm and been aware of this escape route. Such windows should be regularly opened and appropriately marked in addition to personnel being made aware of them during drills.

The spread of fire was so rapid and the smoke so intense that the Master was unable to send distress messages or activate EPIRBS or transponders. All essential signalling systems, including SATCOM, were sighted on the upper bridge deck and destroyed by the fire. The report recommends therefore that the sighting of such equipment should be carefully considered to prevent loss in the event of an emergency.