2011X07 Accidents with On-Load Release Gear
| Accidents with On-Load Release Gear |
- Official Report No. 7025. |
There have been several accidents recently involving "on-load release gear" in lifeboats. MARS 95002described one such incident. I have now received Official Reports into two serious cases, both of which occurred with the same type of release gear fitted in lifeboats supplied in Japan. Reading these reports, it would appear this gear is quite complicated to use and crews need thorough training to avoid having similar accidents. There are numerous types of release gear and each one is a different design – having no standard design makes it more difficult for crews to learn the correct operating procedures. Both incidents almost certainly occurred due to the lack of knowledge regarding the operation of the release gear.
CASE 1 This involved the Panamanian registered bulk carrier "KAYAX" which was built in Japan in 1991. The vessel had a crew of 17, the Master was South Korean and the rest of the crew being composed of nearly equal numbers of Indonesians, Chinese and South Koreans. The accident happened in Portland, Victoria, and was investigated by the Australian Marine Incident Investigation Unit ( PO BOX 594 Canberra ACT 2601. Fax (06) 274 6699 ). A surveyor from the Australian MSA was on board to undertake a grain loading inspection and a Port State Control Inspection. The surveyor asked for the port lifeboat to be lowered to the boat deck level and then be returned to its embarkation position at the davit head. In this position, the surveyor asked for the lifeboat engine to be run ahead and astern. After some minutes, with the engine running but the shaft in neutral, the boat suddenly became detached from the falls and dropped nearly 20m into the water. In the boat were the Master, Second Mate and two ratings. All four were admitted to hospital and the Second Mate sustained serious head and spine injuries. It was concluded that the people initially in the boat (not the Master, who entered the boat later to help) were not sure how to engage the gear lever and whilst attempting to do so pulled the release lever which activated the release as the safety pin was not in the correct position. The instruction manual and the safety notices in the boat were in Japanese and English, neither of the crew members in the boat understood these languages – the languages spoken were Korean, Indonesian and Chinese. The language used for the day-to-day running of the vessel was mostly English while, between themselves, the senior officers used their native language, Korean. Much of the communication was a mixture of languages and use of gestures and sign language.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR RELEASE GEAR
| Release Procedure | Resetting Procedure |
| 1) Remove small safety pin 1 | 1) Insert safety pin 4 into pin hole 6 |
| 2) Raise lever 2 and set socket 3 in place | 2) Reset hooks to the closed position |
| 3) Remove safety pin 4 | 3) Return lever 2 to the original position |
| 4) Pull lever to the stopper 7 | 4) Remove safety pin 4 and insert into lock hole 5 |
| 5) Slide up socket 3 and lower hinged lever 2 | |
| 6) Set small safety pin 1 |
CASE 2 This incident involved a Vanuatu registered reefer – "IVORY ACE" and occurred in Falmouth, UK. An investigation was carried out by the Vanuatu Marine Safety Inspector who was on scene at the time of the accident, the report also contains extracts from the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch. Launching trials had been carried out on the starboard lifeboat. The Second Officer (2/O) was in charge of the lifeboat at the time and had a seaman assisting him, the 2/O was standing by the release gear and had raised the lever to the standby position but he stated that the safety pin was in the "proper position" and was never removed. The 2/O did not use the automatic gear to release the boat as he had been instructed. He released the falls manually as they became slack when the boat reached the water. Shortly after, the "on board" remote lowering control wire was severed when the lifeboat was being manoeuvred away from the ship's side prior to the wire being released. After a short time in the water, the boat was re-attached to the falls and recovered.
The "cut-out" device on the davits was not set correctly and the boat was heaved straight up to the stowed position with a "resounding slap". The Second Officer left the boat to undertake other work and the Third Officer (3/O) was instructed to carry out repairs to the damaged lowering wire. He was just starting work on this when the accident happened, however there was no evidence to suggest that this work contributed towards the accident. The lifeboat disengaged from the falls and fell into the water, damaging the hull as it did so and possibly rolling over during the fall, fortunately, the 3/O and the seaman working in the boat were not seriously injured. Subsequent investigation found that the quadrant locking pin was not, as described by the 2/O, "in the proper position" and may have been in the wrong position for some time prior to the accident. Language problems were not a factor in this incident.
Following this report on accidents with lifeboat release gear, I have received a letter from a rating who is concerned about the safety of crew members during lifeboat drills and who has made unsuccessful attempts to obtain details of the number of lifeboat accidents from the authorities concerned. He quotes some incidents involving brake failure and some injuries that have occurred during drills. Whilst agreeing that we need to have lifeboat drills, he contends that we must find a safer way of holding these drills. One suggestion is that every new rating to the vessel must be taken to the lifeboats and shown how to launch them correctly. He goes on to say:
"When we had open lifeboats, we were always told to hang on to the manropes whenever we were in a lifeboat which was being lowered or raised. Now that a large majority of the lifeboats are completely enclosed this is no longer possible and we are totally dependant on the lowering mechanism. Nobody should be allowed in the lifeboat unless the gripes are properly secured and the harbour pins are in. At lifeboat drills the boat should be lowered to the water with nobody in it and the crew then taken to the lifeboat by launch if possible or by lifeboat ladder if necessary. The crew could then get into the lifeboat, raise it no more than one metre, then do the necessary tests and disembark again before the boat is hoisted up and re-stowed in the davits. I don't trust the quick release mechanism and if we have to practice using it, this should be done as close to the water as possible. If we do not change the way we do the drills, more seamen will get hurt or killed. If the surveyor wants to test the boat, davits and falls, why not use sand bags as weights? When we have a fire drill on board, we are never asked to fight a real fire on the bridge or in the engine room. Similarly, we can practice liferaft drills quite adequately on the quayside. I therefore hope that we can change to a better system of lifeboat drills. I have no joy in writing this letter but if it can be a start to stop seamen being hurt or killed at lifeboat drills it will make my day."
I have reproduced extracts from this letter purely in order to open up the subject for debate. It is difficult to see how the crew can gain sufficient knowledge of launching lifeboats if they are not fully engaged in the process of launching. However, there have been quite a number of accidents which have occurred during lifeboat drills and it is now desirable to review the subject in order to prevent further injuries or deaths.
.... M O R E ....
The Feedback item in the May issue of SEAWAYS regarding lifeboat accidents has generated quite a lot of correspondence. I have taken the following extracts from the letters received. The first is an extract from the March issue of the "Australian Ships and Ports" magazine:
During a 1991 lifeboat drill, the forward fall self-released during recovery of the boat. The sudden weight transmission to the aft fall caused the stern to break away and the remainder of the boat then fell to the water.
In 1992, during recovery of another lifeboat, the after fall was inadvertently released. The boat hung perilously from its forward hook for some time before it could be safely recovered. In 1993, a fatality occurred when maintenance personnel inadvertently released a stowed lifeboat, allowing it to free fall to the water.
These incidents and 89 others, some serious, some minor, were analysed at length by the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OICIMF), and in July 1994 OCIMF issued a report on the matter, 48% of lifeboat incidents occurred during recovery of the boats, 37% during launching.
The aim of the OCIMF study was to reduce the number and gravity of injuries associated with lifeboats. The investigation centred on totally enclosed, fire protected lifeboats but also included freighter and passenger lifeboat incident statistics . Free fall lifeboats also attract some comment. Three percent of reported incidents resulted in fatalities. Some statistical regression would be expected but whatever the regression used, incident potential is obviously alarmingly high.
OICMF recognises that modern lifeboats are deceptively sophisticated, particularly in their falls release systems. Commonly integrated into the release systems are hydrostatic interlocks, on load releases and remote davit brake controls, all of which have become legislative requirements. Handling and maintenance skills have not kept place with the increased sophistication of lifeboat systems.
Another correspondent criticises the design of modern lifeboats.
I can appreciate the sentiments of the author and that is why all new crew members on my ship are taken through familiarisation training before carrying out lifeboat drills. Lifeboats have, in my opinion, on large passenger ferries been 'scaled up' to cater for an ever increasing number of people without proper consideration of the resultant increased size of associated equipment such as bowsing gear etc. They are often far too high above the water and the release gear far too complicated giving rise to inherent problems. Lowering empty boats is not the answer. Water weights are used for testing boats and davits for SWL.
The third comment is a very interesting observation regarding the use of manropes in lifeboats
What concerns me is the widespread and misplaced belief that the manropes suspended from the davit head are there as some sort of security for the people in the boat when it is being lowered or hoisted.
The normal peacetime practice when abandoning ship was for the launching crew to climb down the shipside ladder to board the boat after it was waterborne. War time experience showed that this was too slow and the manropes were supplied to allow the launching crew to slide down the ropes and thus board the quicker. The manropes were supplied with tricing lines spliced into them about 2 fathoms below the span. These allowed the manropes to be brought into the ship's side so that the crew could easily reach them. When preparing to launch the boat, the tricing lines were uncoiled and made fast to the rail. In some ships they were permanently rigged. There used to be 4 manropes per boat but this was reduced to 2 with the introduction of gravity davits.
In a 70 man lifeboat, to suggest that everyone should be able to hold onto the manrope in case anything went wrong is manifestly ridiculous. May we please give this old chestnut a decent burial?
Yes, but surely, if two or four crew are engaged in launching the boat for practice, it is better to hang on to the manropes than to nothing!