200750 - Hand injury during casting off

Hand injury during casting off	MARS Report 200750

Two tankers were involved in a ship-to-ship (STS) operation. Due to rough weather, it was decided to suspend operations. The crew of the mother vessel quickly terminated the cargo transfer, and while the chief officer and second mate were disconnecting the hose, the master called stations fore and aft. It was intended that after disconnecting the hoses, the chief officer would go forward and the second mate aft. During this time, a fitter and an AB arrived at the aft station and observed that one of the daughter vessel's sternlines had parted. The daughter vessel's crew requested the fitter and AB to transfer the broken end back to it. The rope was entangled with the remaining taut sternlines and its broken end was in the water. The fitter attached the messenger on the eye and the two men warped it inboard to obtain sufficient slack before casting it off the bitts for the daughter vessel to then heave in the detached length.

 

However, before the eye was sufficiently slack to be removed from the bitts, the messenger's hitch failed and the AB hastily attempted to reattach the messenger to the mooring rope's eye. With his right hand still positioned between the slack eye and the bitts, the two vessels surged, imposing a sharp load on the sternlines, causing the fouled mooring rope also to suddenly tense. The slack eye snapped back tight, trapping and crushing the AB's right hand against the bitt. As a result, the AB lost the ends of the ring and little fingers and suffered serious crushing of the middle finger.

Root cause/contributory factors

1. Crew members working unsupervised and taking orders from daughter vessel;
2. No communication link with the bridge: fitter and AB did not inform the bridge of the situation and their attempt to free the broken end of the daughter vessel's mooring rope;
3. Poor seamanship: entangled mooring ropes, perhaps caused by passing them through the same fairlead and fitter's initial hitch on the mooring rope's eye was unreliable due to lack of expertise;
4. Late suspension of STS operations: casting off earlier under less adverse conditions would certainly have prevented the series of events. Parting ropes were a clear indication that the safety comfort zone had been breached.

Lessons learnt/corrective actions

1. The area nominated by the charterers for the STS operation was initially considered to be exposed; however due to pressure from some of the parties involved it was reluctantly agreed by managers to go ahead with the operation. With hindsight, managers should have pressed for an alternative operational area. Geographical position of any future STS operations to be thoroughly appraised and discussed with all participating parties (commercial operators included).
2. The safety familiarisation checklist used in this operation does not consider the limitations of the non deck ratings involved in mooring operations.
3. The 'cut off' point for STS operations to be suspended due to deteriorating weather has been amended to 20 knots with hose disconnection, and casting off set at 25 knots.
4. Ratings should not attempt any mooring operations without the presence and supervision of a responsible officer and consent from the bridge. The officer is not expected to operate any machinery or handle any equipment himself. She/he is there to supervise the operation and act as a link between his party and the bridge (master). The officer is responsible for the mooring party and is also expected to watch out for all hazards which his team is likely to encounter and safeguard them by stopping, redirecting, warning members of her/his team.
5. The safety familiarisation checklist is to include a paragraph stressing limitations of the non deck ratings being used during mooring operations.
6. This investigation report is to be circulated among the company vessels and shipping industry.

> Investigations confirmed that the fitter and AB had been resting immediately prior to the incident; the fitter for 1.5 hours and the AB for 3.5 hours. Fatigue was not considered to have contributed to this accident.