200525 Collision

Collision
MARS Report 200525

One of our ships was on an offshore passage when another ship was noticed by radar on her port beam. Being a fine, clear, calm day the approaching ship was soon in sight. She was approaching on a steady bearing from the port beam at high speed. It was soon apparent that she was a major container ship. The ship's watch officer called her by VHF, addressing her as the "crossing container ship" to find out her intentions as it was apparent to him that she should give way whilst he should keep his course and speed. The container ship never acknowledged our ship's VHF calls which became more frequent and intense as the ships closed the distance between them.

With a collision no longer unavoidable, our ship sounded 5 short blasts on her whistle. Hearing this, the master rushed to the bridge. Immediately, he noticed the watch officer using the VHF to call the other ship now at a distance of some 3 cables and approaching at speed on the port side. The master immediately sounded the crew general alarm and altered the course hard to starboard.

In the subsequent full speed collision, the ships came alongside each other on almost parallel courses. Our ship's inner and outer hulls, for almost the full length of her parallel mid body on her port side, were evenly set in from the tank top to the upper deck by up to about 18 inches. Subsequently, she went into the nearest port where she was unloaded and her hull was strengthened with temporary external stiffeners. Then she was given classification permission to sail to a ship repair yard for repairs.

In our inquiry we found our SMS procedures were not fully implemented. The master had not issued any written standing orders. There was no instruction from him that he was to be called if ever any doubt arose concerning his ship's safety. The watch officer ignored our SMS procedures that the COLREGS were to be strictly followed and that the master was to be called if ever the watch officer was in doubt or felt that the VHF should be used as a collision avoidance tool. However, the essence seems to have been that the watch officer misunderstood the COLREGS in that he seems to have had no awareness that the "stand-on" ship should give way before a collision is inevitable.

I believe watch officers ought to call the master before using the VHF for close quarters or collision avoidance as it can give rise to doubts and misunderstandings and can be a distraction. I also feel that, in clear weather, the only assistance the watch officer needs to avoid close quarters situations developing, is his own sight and the compass bearings. Then he can decide if a risk of collision exists and what he needs to do. All else might become a distraction - even a dangerous distraction.