200409 Confession

Confession
MARS Report 200409

I used to pride myself on my navigation and "Rule of the Road" skills, having had 13 years of experience at sea. However, a recent event and near miss reminded me of my own complacency and how, even the best of us, sometimes take (the wrong) things for granted with nearly drastic consequences.

Own vessel was on a course of 090 x 12 knots, off the coast of Oman. We were due to make an alteration of course to 075 in 10 minutes time. It was a clear dark night. A container vessel on parallel course at a speed of 21 knots was overtaking us on the port quarter, giving a CPA of 0.2 miles in 20 minutes. I was observing this vessel for the previous 20 minutes and she did not seem to have any intention to keep clear. I was concerned with the small CPA and gave her five flashes on the ALDIS lamp. There was no response. I was also (I realise now, unwarrantedly) concerned of the alteration that I was due to make to port according to the passage plan.

When the vessel was about 2 miles behind us, I made the mistake of altering course to port to make the alteration as per the passage plan. The previous CPA of 0.2 miles now became 0.1 mile in 10 minutes. I now started giving more rapid flashes to the overtaking vessel, which were about as fast as my heartbeat! Suddenly, the container vessel altered her course to starboard and headed for a collision course! I put the wheel hard-over to starboard but realised that it was a point of no return - any action on MY part now could not prevent a collision unless the other vessel altered to port. I did, in desperation, what I always tell my cadets NOT to do - I reached for the VHF and said "container ship on my port quarter - I am altering to starboard - please alter YOUR course to PORT". Miraculously this had the desired effect and she altered just in time to port passing us at a CPA of less than 0.1 mile.

After the incident, as our nerves calmed down, we analysed the near miss and the following factors seemed contributory to me. I would welcome comments from others if they see other factors:

1. As per rule 13, the overtaking vessel had the duty to keep clear, even after we made our alteration to port. As per rule "Action to avoid collision" though, we should have altered to starboard on seeing the overtaking vessel not taking action.
2. The decision to make the normal course alteration to port (as per the passage plan) was a bad one and should have been delayed.
3. Having been on container ships for 5 years, I know for a fact that container ships "get tired" of altering for vessels they are overtaking and find a CPA of 0.1 to 0.3 miles in open seas quiet sufficient. I am simply stating facts as they are and not trying to justify anything.
4. It also seemed that the watch on the container ship had not seen us (were they busy in chartroom?) and they were only alerted at the second set of quick flashes. Then panic must have set in there and, seeing our port side light and masthead light, the OOW must have decided to alter to starboard. It is doubtful if her ARPA would have shown the vector correctly at such close range, especially if she was not tracking us earlier. It appears that the OOW must have put the wheel hard-over and then possibly checked other bridge equipment.
5. Of course, the entire near-miss could have been avoided if the overtaking vessel had just altered well in time and given us a berth of say 1 mile, but then, we don't live in a perfect world!

Under most circumstances, a close quarters situation with another vessel is far more risky than missing the waypoint by a few cables. If a slight adjustment to the waypoint on a coastal passage is more risky than having a collision, there must be something drastically wrong with the Passage Plan. Similarly, is it wise to put a position on the chart or make an entry in the log book when there are other vessels or hazards in close proximity? Make sure that there is no risk of collision or grounding before carrying out these secondary tasks.