200220 Over the Limit

Over the Limit
Report No. 200220

Vessel type: SBT type oil products carrier purposely fitted for the carriage of black products (heavy oils and asphalt). Loading a consignment of asphalt at Willemstad, Curacao, for carriage to Kingstown, Canada (St. Lawerence Seaway and Great Lakes region).

The vessel's Chief Mate prepared the cargo plan complete with loading and deballasting sequence. Upon Master's approval of the Chief Mate's intentions, Duty Officers (including the Chief Mate himself) were fully responsible for any cargo or ballast operation during his/her duty period (4 hours on, 8 hours off basis). The Chief Mate was obliged to attend pre-shipment independent cargo cleanliness inspection and post shipment independent cargo inspector ullage survey. A similar regime was followed at the discharging ports, particularly requiring that any Duty Officer would deal with any stripping operation coming during his/her duty period. The duty crew consisted of the Duty Officer, an AB and one out of two available pump men (the latter working on 6 hrs on / 6 hrs off basis). The system worked by remotely actuated cargo valves from control consoles at various locations on the ship's upper deck, each console housing the valves to a group of cargo and / or ballast tanks. No remote ullaging system was operational, all tanks needed monitoring by means of manually operated sounding / ullaging tapes.

The Chief Mate's instructions on this occasion were to call him towards the completion of the loading, when the last tank being loaded reached a certain pre-calculated ullage. He did not disclose the reason for this request. Before going to bed he called the 2nd Mate (i.e. the reporter of this article) and told him that at the current loading rate the above ullage would be reached shortly before 0400 and advised the pre-calculated tank's final ullage.

Eventually the loading rate was slowed down and at 0340 the 2nd Mate instructed the duty AB to wake up the Chief Mate, due to take over at 0400. Human beings we all are, it happened that the Chief Mate slept having his cabin's door locked. In spite of the fact that all crew members on board knew that he liked to disguise his partly bald head by covering it with purposely grown hair and that he made use of a woman's hair net to prevent this arrangement from developing some messy condition during his rest periods. The AB knocked on the Chief Mate's door and reported back on deck where he was needed to give a hand in the topping up process. Not unusually, neither at sea nor in port, the Chief Mate did not report on deck at 0400 hrs, at which time the last tank to be topped up had not reached the pre-calculated ullage but it was getting close. The AB coming on duty was instructed by the 2nd Mate to go and find out what was going on with the Chief Mate and wake him up by any possible means if the latter was not already having a cup of coffee in the Officers' pantry.

The AB proceeded as instructed and shortly after the Chief Mate reported on deck, asked what the tank ullage was and hurried ashore. He checked the vessel's drafts and yelled at the Second Mate to call the shore facility on the agreed VHF channel and ask them to stop loading. The tank's pre-calculated final ullage had not as yet been reached. Readers will be aware of the St. Lawrence's Seaway lock draft restrictions. The vessel had until that time been trading from Central America to various ports which had no draft restrictions at all. However, due to her thermal oil cargo tanks heating system, she had been sub-chartered to carry the asphalt consignment to Kingstown and then stay as an inland waterway or home trader in the St. Lawrence Seaway. It goes without saying that, had the Second Mate been informed of the draft restrictions he would have been paying more attention both to the tank's ullage and the ship's drafts.

A most embarrassing situation arose. During the sea passage all disposable consumables (including fresh water) were pumped overboard. On arriving at the first lock, at Montreal, the ship was slightly listed to the opposite side where the lock's staff on duty were standing ashore. The latter were not stupid and proceeded to read the ship's draft on both sides, eventually finding that the vessel was drawing one to two inches in excess of the allowable draft. The vessel was instructed to proceed to one of the lay-by berths. P&I assistance was called in and they arranged for some of the cargo to be discharged into tanker trucks on the quay. The ship's cargo pumps were engaged and we were at pains not to overload the trucks (obviously the pumps were rated well in excess of the truck's capacity). Once the above operation was completed, the vessel was allowed to proceed through the locks. In addition to the extra expenses incurred, the vessel arrived at the discharging port three days late.

Some years later, when the Second Officer in question quit sailing, he went to work as a cargo expeditor on crude oil carriers discharging at various SBMs and indeed monitored in excess of 50 discharges. He watched crews of many nationalities at work. Subsequently working as cargo inspector on both liquid and dry-cargo carriers and for the last 8 years has been a practising marine and nautical surveyor and consultant. In spite of the ISM coming into force, the reporter still notes that an occurrence like the one he experienced can happen at any time. Further, that on the larger tankers the Chief Mate remains the 'director of the orchestra' playing all 'instruments' during cargo operations while the Junior Deck Officers work 6 hrs on / 6 hrs off duty periods doing mostly 'running errand' work.

With the provisions of STCW78/95 now in force world wide, the Chief Mate's capacity is clearly identified as being a member of the shipboard management team. Management does not mean continuous 'hands on' involvement (albeit it may be appropriate on occasions) nor hiding key information but wise planning of the corresponding operations and a good use of the resources available (including human resources). Furthermore, no Junior Officer will ever be able to successfully work in the capacity of Chief Officer unless he has previously been given increasing responsibilities.

No wonder an article by a dry bulk serving Shipmaster published in January 2002 issue of Seaways blames newly appointed Chief Mates for their lack of competence. The point may be that indeed some dry bulk STCW78/95 training and endorsement would be worth a thought but certainly, that Junior Officers learn their future business in due course. No Navy would ever face this kind of situation. They long ago figured out right career paths, continuous professional development and, may I dare to say, solved the matter of Officers retention by assigning them shipboard duties followed by shore-based positions on alternate basis until the individual concerned goes on retirement.