2011X55 Grounding of YORKTOWN CLIPPER

 Canadian Report
- Halifax, NS.
- Report No. 7023offrep

This Official Report concerns a grounding caused mainly by the navigational planning and positioning procedures being inadequate to accurately identify the vessel's position and to warn the navigator of the danger of running aground. This was coupled with the fact that the watch officer was not qualified in radar navigation. This report was compiled by the US National Transportation Safety Board. The full report can be obtained from: National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161. Tel. (703) 487-4600.

The 224-foot-long passenger vessel YORKTOWN CLIPPER was on a regular weekly Alaska cruise in Glacier Bay. The master had completed his regularly scheduled watch and had been relieved by the Second Officer (2/O) at 1230. The vessel was at the foot of the Margerie Glacier and a National Park Service Ranger had been describing the area to the passengers. The 2/O manoeuvred the vessel slowly in the area until other sightseeing vessels had moved out of the way. At 1245 he began his departure from Glacier Bay. About every hour as the vessel progressed, the 2/O entered the vessel's position and heading in the Log. He did not plot the position information on the chart. He navigated by visually observing the vessel's position with respect to its surroundings and by using radar, which was not stabilised by input from the ship's gyro compass. As the vessel neared the southern end of the bay, the 2/O decided to navigate between Lone Island and Geikie Rock as he had done on two prior voyages. The gyro heading was 1350, the starboard radar was on the 6 mile range and the port radar on 3 mile range. The 2/O set one variable range marker at _ mile to indicate that he should begin a turn to the left when that range marker advanced to Geikie Rock. A second range marker was set at 1_ miles to indicate that he should begin turning back to the right for Whidbey Passage when that range marker reached Drake Island.

Both Geikie Rock and Lone Island were visible. They are separated by about 1.8 miles, but each is surrounded by shallow water that covers rocks extending outward about _ mile. The tidal range in this area that day was about 20 feet. A large rock about 900 yards to the Northeast of Geikie Rock is uncovered at low tide, but it was submerged and not visible as the YORKTOWN CLIPPER approached. The 2/O stated that the vessel was being steered by auto pilot at full speed of about 11.3 knots and he was at the control console as he began manoeuvring to pass between the two islands. The vessel's draft was about 8 feet 4 inches. Suddenly, about 1532, the vessel struck bottom, the bow jolted upward, the vessel lurched to the right and continued travelling forwards. The master and 1st Officer immediately rushed to the bridge. The master stopped the engines, took the steering out of auto pilot and asked the 2/O to determine their location. The master could not see what they had hit and he was uncertain of their location. The vessel had been extensively damaged and the passengers had to be evacuated. However, no announcement was made to the passengers until about 15 minutes after the grounding With considerable help from ashore the vessel was patched up over a period of about three days. Fortunately, no-one was injured.

Findings

The grounding was not caused by weather, equipment failures or crew fatigue.
The navigational planning and positioning procedures used by the 2/O were inadequate to accurately identify the vessels position or to warn him of the danger of running aground.
Had the 2/O been properly trained as a radar observer, he might have made more effective use of the radar and thereby prevented his navigational errors.
Had the radar been gyro stabilised, it would have facilitated the taking and plotting of accurate fixes.
Had Clipper Cruise Line and the master exercised more oversight in the navigation of the vessel, including requiring passage planning in preparation for every voyage and setting standards for the accuracy and plotting of fixes, the vessel would have been navigated more safely in the vicinity of Geikie Rock.

The passengers and crew would have been better prepared to respond to an emergency if they had been informed of the situation immediately on grounding.
The crew, the Coast Guard and the National Park service responded effectively in preventing harm to passengers and in saving the vessel from possible sinking.