200719 Collision with fishing vessel

A tanker coasting along a busy sea route collided with a fishing vessel during the 04.00-08.00 morning bridge watch. The fishing vessel sustained extensive damage above the waterline and her crew suffered minor injuries but she safely made port under her own power. The tanker sustained only minor scuffing damage on her bow. The watch was made up of an experienced officer and a seaman lookout. At the time of the collision, it was dark, the visibility was good (> 8 NM), the wind was light, the sea state was calm and the traffic density was light. The vessel was approaching a waypoint to alter course from 295°G to 270°G. A red light was reported by the lookout fine to port at 04:41 and again reported at 04:56. The officer was monitoring the three cm radar set on 12 NM range and observing no nearby target along the reported bearing, wrongly assumed the light to be coming from a distant radar target (>9 NM) that was 'painting' showing on a similar bearing. However, the simplified voyage data recorder (SVDR) data that was later retrieved showed that the fishing vessel's echo was picked up quite clearly by the 10 cm radar.

Soon afterwards, at the charted waypoint, the officer altered course to port with small changes in the autopilot course selector. As the tanker steadied on the new course of 270°G, a single red light was observed closing from right ahead at very close range and disappeared beneath the bow. A collision occurred at 04:59: from the starboard side of the bridge, the officer and the lookout observed a fishing vessel was passing down the starboard side. The emergency alarm was sounded and the master arrived on the bridge.

The tanker reduced to manoeuvring revolutions and turned around to assist the fishing vessel, while preparing the rescue boat and lifesaving appliances. The nearest coast radio station and coastguard were informed and the designated person was advised by telephone. The tanker attempted to make radio contact with the fishing vessel but this was not successful, possibly due to the damage sustained in the collision. After confirming only superficial damage to own vessel, the tanker stood by until a coastguard vessel reached the fishing vessel to escort her into port. On being cleared by the coastal state authorities, the tanker continued on her voyage, arriving at her destination after two days. At this point an investigation team boarded. Statements were taken and evidence removed from the vessel, included the SVDR data. The officer went on leave for a few weeks and was subsequently interviewed at length in the company office. In conjunction with the SVDR data that had been decoded and studied, the following root causes / contributory factors were determined:

Root causes/contributory factors
The lights of the fishing vessel were not positively verified against a radar target;
The fishing vessel was hastily, and wrongly, thought to be a ship that was several miles farther away after inadequate observation (assumption based on scanty information);
Radar observation was undertaken only on the three cm radar, which was probably not tuned to optimum performance;
The 3 cm and 10 cm radars were on different ranges but the three cm was inappropriately set to the longer range (12 NM) and the 10 cm was set to the shorter range (6 NM);
The course alteration at the waypoint was made using the autopilot in small increments that would not have been readily apparent to the fishing vessel, observing visually or by radar;
The officer did not advise the lookout of the alteration of course;
The performance of the lookout could have been better by using more of the tools available to him.

Corrective actions taken
The officer was issued with a written formal warning, relieved at the next port and summoned to a company investigation after a month's home leave.
The officer was given additional training at a bridge team management (BTM) course prior to his next appointment. He undertook a senior management team workshop course to improve his leadership and integrated team working skills.
Details of the incident were promulgated to the fleet, highlighting the mistakes made and the best practices that should be adhered to.
Failures in best practice identified will be raised with the institutions that conduct the company bridge team management courses.
Details of the incident were promulgated throughout the industry.

Lessons learnt
10 cm (S band) radar provides better detection of small targets at all ranges and should be used as the primary anti-collision radar.
The 3 cm (X band) radar provides better definition which can improve the accuracy of bearings and ranges used for position fixing.
Observed lights should be positively identified and compared with radar targets to avoid making assumptions on the basis of scanty information.
All available means should be used to observe and identify hazards to navigation including sight, hearing, AIS and radar (including guard rings, where appropriate).
Radar range scale and tuning (gain, sea clutter, rain clutter) should be regularly adjusted throughout the watch in order to detect weak radar targets.
The bridge team should develop and sustain a strong working relationship between officer and lookout. This includes efficient communications and mutual vigilance so that an 'error chain' can be prevented and broken if one is sensed.
All information exchanged should be concise, prioritised and mutual understanding and intentions clearly acknowledged by every member of the bridge team.
The lookout should be encouraged to make use of navigational aids such as radar to increase their situational awareness.

Editor's note: Compliments to the reporting company for a very open report and non-vindictive corrective actions taken. This case illustrates the consequences of poor radar operation, assumptions based on scanty information and inadequate bridge teamwork. Despite the auto-tune capability of modern radars, the officer and the lookout should communicate effectively on duty and 'visual intelligence' should be verified with radars optimally set up and tuned.