200615 Engine room fire No 2

15 Jan 2006 MARS

 

About a year ago there was a potentially major incident on one of our technically managed vessels which, under different circumstances, might have had significant consequences regarding the safety of the vessel and her crew.

Shortly after 0700 the bridge OOW was advised that one of the generators had to be stopped; no explanation was given at the time. Several minutes later the fire control panel indicated a fire in zone 13 (engine room). Calls to the engine control room were unanswered and the general alarm was sounded shortly thereafter. Emergency teams were mustered and duties assigned once the nature of the problem was identified.

The vessel's course and speed were adjusted to control its motion in order to facilitate activities associated with the incident.

It was reported that the vessel was rolling heavily in bad weather and oil drums stowed within the engine room had broken free from their lashings. At the time of the incident the engine room was manned and the engine room ratings were undertaking their routine duties, having started work at 0600. At about 0645 one of the oilers reported to the fitter that there had been a lubricating oil spill in the engine room and this was immediately reported to the on-call duty engineer. In the meantime, some of this oil had dripped on to no. one generator turbo charger causing a large volume of smoke to be generated, which developed into a small local fire.

The engine-room ratings fought the fire with local portable extinguishers (one of which was reported as defective). Concurrently the duty engineer called the second engineer, who advised the bridge of the need to stop one generator; however in the confusion, the wrong generator was stopped. This was rectified by the chief engineer on his arrival in the engine room.

The fire was quickly brought under control and clean up operations initiated immediately. Emergency squads had been mustered and on standby to assist with the incident ? but their assistance was not required as the fire had been dealt with promptly by the engine room staff.

Causes

It was immediately apparent that the spilt oil had originated from drums of oil stowed within the engine room, which had broken free due to the excessive motion of the vessel in heavy weather. The securing of these drums was evidently inadequate for the intended purpose: either the lashings used or their securing points were not capable of restraining the oil drums or were poorly adjusted/secured. The main causes were inadequate securing of oil drums stored within the engine room space and oil leaking from the unsecured / broached oil drums dripped on to the turbo-charger casing of one of the running generators, the heat of which generated large volumes of smoke. In the confusion the wrong generator was stopped which probably resulted in the oil on the turbocharger casing igniting.

Lessons learnt
  • Where possible oil drums should not be stowed in the engine-room space.
  • If loose gear (such as oil drums) are stowed within the engine-room space (or any space), the lashings and securing points should be adequate for the purpose.
  • Lashings and securing points should be regularly inspected, a proper routine should be included in appropriate check lists.
  • Had the engine-room ratings not been working in the engine room, the consequences of this incident could have been a major engine-room fire and possible loss of the vessel.
  • Fire-fighting equipment should be properly and regularly inspected and tested to ensure it is in full working order, given the failure of one fire extinguisher in this incident.

Ed note: The immediate sounding of the fire alarm and the need for effective communications between the engine room and bridge should be added to the 'Lessons learnt' list.