2011X27 Yacht/Tug and Tow Collision
| Yacht/Tug and Tow Collision |
Summary of Official NZ MSA Report |
The following is a report of a disastrous accident between a yacht and a tug and tow. The full report is available from the MSA of New Zealand website
www.msa.govt.nz/Accidents/gettingreports.htm
In November 2001, the 12m sloop Toolka T was returning to her home port in New Zealand following a four month cruise. At 4am, the helmsperson (and sole crew on watch) determined that her vessel was on a reciprocal course to a power-driven vessel. She later admitted that she saw that the power-driven vessel was exhibiting other lights apart from a sidelight and masthead light, but did not know what they signified, and assumed it was a fishing vessel. The helmsperson had 27 years experience crewing on coastal and offshore sailing vessels.
Following a series of manoeuvres, the vessels passed starboard to starboard. The helmsperson on the yacht monitored the passing vessel closely to determine when it would be safe to pass behind the vessel and resume her original course. Deciding she was well past the vessel, she turned to starboard.
The other vessel was in fact the tug Wainui, towing a 40.7m, 547 tonne barge, the Sea Tow II, and was displaying the correct lights! As the yacht crossed astern of Wainui, her keel became fouled in the submerged towline and the yacht started to lose way. The helmsperson shouted for assistance and was joined by two other crew members who saw the Sea Tow II heading right for the yacht. Despite their efforts to avoid collision, the Toolka T struck the bow of the barge and within a few seconds of the collision sunk beneath the Sea Tow II. The helmsperson and two other crew were rescued, but her partner, the skipper of the yacht and an experienced blue water yachtsman, did not survive.
The Maritime Safety investigation cites the following factors contributing to this tragic outcome:
these are not listed in order of importance
3.1 WAINUI
3.1.1 The failure to determine at an early stage, that risk of collision existed.
3.1.2 The failure of the watchkeeper to operate the controls and reduce speed to increase the catenary of the tow line.
3.1.3 The failure of the watchkeeper to operate the horn, spotlight or tow line floodlights to warn Toolka T that it was running into danger.
3.1.4 The failure to call the Master at a time when the watchkeepers were unaware of the course, speed or CPA of Toolka T.
3.1.5 The failure of the Master and Owners to ensure that all watchkeepers were fully compliant with the following:
a) Knowledge of the Collision Rules.
b) Sufficiently familiar with the engine throttle and gear controls to be able to operate them quickly in an emergency.
c) Sufficiently familiar with the operation of the horn, spotlight and tow line.
d) To be able to utilise floodlights immediately in emergency situations.
e) Knowledge and application of the requirements of the SSM manual.
3.1.6 The failure to contact Toolka T on VHF channel 16, in breach of the standing orders.
3.1.7 The failure of the Master and watchkeepers to comply with the safety requirements of the SSM manual.
3.1.8 The failure to keep a proper lookout, both visually and by radar, in breach Rule 5 of the Collision Regulations
3.1.9 The failure to sound five short rapid blasts, as required under Rule 34(d) of the Collision Regulations.
This is required when:
a) Either fails to understand the intentions or actions of the other.
b) If there is doubt whether sufficient action is being taken by the other to avoid collision.
3.1.10 Lack of knowledge of the Regulations.
3.2 TOOLKA T
3.2.1 The inability of the helmsperson to identify Wainui as a towing vessel, with a tow in excess of 200 metres.
3.2.2 The failure of the helmsperson to call the Skipper:
a) For guidance, when she was unsure of the identity of the lights exhibited by Wainui.
b) As soon as it became apparent that a close quarters situation with Wainui was developing.
3.2.3 The failure of the helmsperson to keep a good all round lookout instead of concentrating on the tug Wainui.
3.2.4 The failure of the helmsperson to contact Wainui on VHF channel 16 when she was unsure of its intentions.
3.2.5 The failure to sound five short, rapid blasts, as required under Rule 34(d) of the Collision Regulations.
3.2.6 The decision of the helmsperson to alter course to starboard after clearing the stern of Wainui.
3.2.7 The lack of knowledge of the Collision Regulations by the helmsperson on Toolka T.
3.2.8 The decision of the Skipper to leave a helmsperson in charge of a watch, whose eyesight was known to be impaired and whose lack of knowledge of the identity of navigational lights rendered it unsafe for her to keep a watch by herself, particularly in coastal waters where close quarter situations with other vessels was likely to occur.