200311 The Bridge Team

The Bridge Team
Report No. 200311

A vessel grounded during a heavy rainsquall that had reduced both visual and radar observations to near zero. The bridge team consisted of the Master, two Third Officers, Helmsman, and two Pilots as required by the specific port regulations. One Pilot had the con, and the second Pilot monitored the ARPA radar. The Master monitored the bridge team activities, navigational systems, and the second ARPA radar. The two Third Officers monitored the vessel's position, the Helmsman and bridge telegraph, and one Ordinary Seaman remained on the forecastle head as required by USCG regulations.

The passage was uneventful until torrential rain reduced both visual and radar observations to near zero, making it impossible to identify the buoys on the radars, despite judicious manipulation of the 'Rain Clutter' control. At this point, the Pilot who had the con became disorientated as to the exact position of the vessel in relation to the centre line of the canal, initially ordering a 15o alteration to port on a heading of 161o (T). On reaching a heading of 146o(T), the Pilot ordered hard to starboard and a discussion ensued between both Pilots as to the advisability of such radical manoeuvre.

At this point, the Master informed both Pilots that a small radar target, possibly a buoy, had been identified to starboard. Whereby the Pilot having the con ordered a hard to port manoeuvre, and the vessel subsequently grounded close on a heading of 200o (T). The actual course for this section of the canal being 161o (T).

'Course Recorder', 'Bell Book' entries and interviews with Master, watch Officers and Helmsman have verified the above manoeuvres of the vessel prior to the grounding.

Conclusions:

1. The most probable cause of the vessel grounding was due to the Pilot becoming disorientated when heavy rain obscured both visual and radar observations and the radical alteration of course to starboard.
2. A contributory factor to the vessel grounding may be ascribed to the Master in failing to take timely and appropriate action on becoming aware that the Pilot had become disorientated.
3. The above failings were compounded by the Bridge Team failing to bring to the Master's and Pilot's attention that both the alteration of course to port and the radical alteration of course to starboard would place the vessel in danger.

Corrective Action

Company procedures require that the vessel's progress be monitored when the Pilot has the con exactly as it has to be under any other condition. Ideally the monitoring needs to be carried out by the OOW and the Master should be made aware of deviations from planned track or speed as if he had the con. From such information the Master will then be in a position to question the Pilot with diplomacy and confidence.

This incident demonstrates a breakdown in the relationship between the Bridge Team and the Pilot. As a result the Company has implemented corrective action in that the Master and Deck officers involved will attend a Bridge Team/Pilot Relationship course on a full mission ship bridge simulator. Particular emphasis will be placed upon situational awareness and leadership, in recognition that people and behaviours make or break good safety standards. The programme will be extended to all Masters and Deck Officers within the Group over a twelve-month period.