200233 Master/Pilot Relationship

02 Feb 2002 MARS

Master/Pilot Relationship
Report No. 200233

A partially loaded tanker grounded in poor visibility on the American coast. A Master/Pilot exchange, including appraisal of the prevailing and probable weather conditions forecast for the transit was conducted in accordance with Company Passage Planning procedures prior to getting underway. Fog had prevailed at the berth during the morning but had cleared by the time the vessel left the berth and two of the tugs confirmed that the weather was clear during their transit of the channel to attend the vessel. At approximately 30 minutes into the channel transit, the vessel ran into fog with visibility down to between one and two cables. Lookouts were posted at the bow and the 'bridge-team' increased. The pilot recalled the tugs and requested that they stand by the vessel, with one tug being instructed to lead the vessel in the channel. During transit the pilot used both visual and radar observations for position fixing, while the bow lookouts reported the sighting of channel buoys as the vessel passed, with a 'bridge-team' member logging the time, ship's head, and speed from GPS in the Bell Book.

A large alteration of course was required to pass between an island and the mainland. Inexplicably the pilot failed to execute the 'wheel-over', leaving the vessel heading directly for the land ahead. The pilot, upon realising the perilous situation developing, took belated corrective action but failed to prevent the vessel touching bottom in the vicinity of the headland. On touching bottom, the vessel, due to bank effect, veered across the channel and grounded near the NE end of the island.

The vessel was re-floated with the assistance of the escort tugs, which were now made fast, and anchored in a nearby anchorage. The Coast Guard was notified immediately of the grounding and the sounding of all empty tanks and void spaces including verification of cargo tank ullages commenced. No personnel injuries were sustained as a result of the grounding. Sounding and ullaging confirmed that no pollution had resulted. As a further precaution, a diving team was organised to survey the vessel's underwater hull and rudder area for damage.

Conclusions

The root cause of the incident was due to poor visibility compounded by excessive speed for the prevailing conditions and the pilot's ineffective use of the radar equipment to monitor the vessel's position during transit. The bell book entries indicate that, on encountering fog, the pilot (without protest or intervention from the Master) did not reduce speed commensurate with prevailing conditions. Therefore, on failing to alter course at the planned 'wheel-over' position, combined with inappropriate speed for the prevailing conditions, the pilot was left with little room for manoeuvre or time for critical decision making, and the grounding of the vessel became to some extent inevitable.

A contributory factor was the distraction of the 'bridge-team' in the vicinity of a critical 'wheel-over' position due to the pilot's decision to subsequently make the tugs fast, compounded by the Master's reluctance to take the 'con' from the Pilot even though being aware of the precarious situation developing. In this instance, the Master chose only to question the pilot's intentions, not having the confidence to override the pilot's judgement, experience and local knowledge.

The safety of the vessel is the Master's primary consideration and responsibility. Therefore it is appropriate to emphasise the critical nature of the Master/Pilot relationship, and the Master's obligation to monitor the pilot's performance and execution of the vessel's passage plan at ALL times. The Master/Pilot relationship also includes the full participation of all members of the 'bridge-team' in the monitoring and execution of the voyage form berth to berth.