Grounding of MALINSKA

 - Australia.
- Official Report No. 7019.

A report by the Marine Incident Investigation Unit of the Australian Department of Transport and Communications features a bulk carrier going aground. The MALINSKA, a Maltese flag vessel of 34,752 tonnes deadweight, loaded a full cargo of Manganese ore at the Groote Eylandt loading Terminal. When departing, the ship, which should have cleared via a narrow channel of deep water through a bank stretching southward from Connexion Island, grounded on Burley Shoal, 1.5 miles north of "the gap". Initial attempts to refloat the ship were unsuccessful and 1,100 tonnes of cargo had to be offloaded before the ship could be refloated. Copies of the report can be obtained from: GPO BOX 594,Canberra ACT 2601. Tel (06) 274 7111, Telex 62018, Fax 257 2505.

The Harbour Master (HM) went to the Master's cabin at 1700 to obtain signatures on the cargo documents. He found that the Master was entertaining a number of adults and children. The Master offered the Harbour Master a drink of whisky but he declined. Although he was not aware that the Master was drinking, he noticed a certain unsteadiness or lack of direction when the Master stamped and signed the documents. When the paper work was completed at 1730, the Harbour Master proceeded to the bridge, to pilot the ship off the berth, while the Master called the crew to stations.

The Harbour Master was joined on the bridge by the Third Mate (3/O) and a seaman. By the time the ship was singled up and the tugs made fast the Master had still not appeared. When the HM asked the 3/O where the Master was, the 3/O gestured towards the quay. He saw the Master on the wharf saying good-bye to his guests. The ship had moved about a metre off the quay and was pushed back alongside by the tugs so that the Master could climb back aboard.

When the ship was clear of the berth the HM advised the Master of an inbound ship, the IRON CARPENTARIA, the Master of which had said he would keep clear of the MALINSKA by keeping to the south and that he would pass "port to port". Being a little concerned as to whether the Master had fully understood, the HM repeated the whole message to the 3/O.

The tugs were let go at 1756 and the HM brought the ship round to proceed due west, but because of the northerly tide instructed the helmsman to steer 260 degrees. After checking astern from the bridge wing for line of drift against the shore, the HM found that the Master had made further adjustment to the course, which led him to believe that the Master was aware of the northerly set and had taken over. He advise the Master of the correct course, 232 degrees for proceeding south of Connexion Island, then left the bridge escorted by the 3/O and disembarked to the tug MAKADA.

As soon as the tug was clear the Master brought the vessel on to the 232 degrees course, increased speed to half ahead and then to full ahead, "finished with manoeuvring", at 1810, at which time the 3/O plotted the ship's position on the chart. After this, the propeller pitch was gradually increased in small increments to work up to full speed.

The tug proceeded out towards the IRON CARPENTARIA and worked up to a full speed of 8 knots, then reduced again to 4/5 knots on reaching the normal boarding area but continued on the 232 degree course. The inbound ship was first seen (by those on the tug) shortly after 1800 at a distance stated to be four miles, as it cleared beyond Connexion Island. With MALINSKA steadied on 232 degrees, the inbound ship was about 50 degrees on the starboard bow.

The Master acquired the inbound ship as a target on the ARPA, which was operating in the "true motion, course up" mode and switched to the 6 mile range. The range rings were not switched on. At 1815 the crew were stood down from stations forward. The Mate gave instructions to the Bosun to secure the anchors, he then went to his cabin to wash and change out of his boiler suit before going to the bridge to take up his watch.

At 1830 the 3/O plotted MALINSKA's position, again using the radar bearing and distance of the south point of Connexion Island, and the Master switched the radar from the 6 mile to the 3 mile range. At this time the inbound ship was said to be 25/30 degrees on the starboard bow. While the 3/O was plotting the position, the inbound ship called on VHF 16 requesting a port to port passing, the Master confirmed this. Very shortly after this the inbound ship was observed to be altering course to port and the ARPA indicated a collision situation with, according to the Master, a target course of 070/075 degrees and a distance of 1.9 miles. The Master said that he checked the radar bearing (259 degrees) and distance (1.9 miles) of the ship and that the visual indication was that the ship was close, therefore immediate avoiding action was needed. Whereas an alteration to port would have taken the MALINSKA away from the shoal waters, the Master had agreed to pass port to port and he therefore considered that an alteration to starboard was necessary, even though it would take him off the recommended track towards the Burley Shoal. He checked the course of 260 degrees on the radar using the electronic bearing line, and satisfied that it was a safe one, ordered the helmsman to steer 260 degrees.

The skipper of the tug and the HM noticed this alteration and called the MALINSKA on the VHF to warn them that they were standing into danger but despite repeated calls they received no response. The Mate said he arrived on the bridge at 1825 as the ship was coming on to the new course, the inbound ship was 2/3 degrees on the port bow. The 3/O handed over to him, showing him the 1820 position on the chart, advising him of the engine status, of the inbound ship's request for port to port and that the Master was altering course to starboard. The 3/O then left the bridge. The Mate then went to the radar and noted that the target echo of the IRON CARPENTARIA was just to port of the heading line, he then took a bearing and distance of Connexion Island to check the ship's position. After about five minutes on the 260 course, and as the Mate was laying off and checking the position on the chart (which showed the ship to be very close to the Burley Shoals), the Master instructed the helmsman to put the wheel to port 15, in order to follow the stern of the inbound ship as it opened out. However, the helmsman, having applied port 15 wheel, advised the Master that the ship was not responding.

Almost immediately after this the Chief Engineer telephoned the bridge to say that the load on the engine had increased considerably. The Mate went to the bridge wing and looked over the side, he advised the Master that the ship was not moving through the water. Although the Master could not believe it, as no shock or jerk had been felt, MALINSKA was aground.

It is concluded that:

While proceeding towards "the gap", MALINSKA experienced a strong northerly set and the position plotted on the chart by the 3/O at 1820 was incorrect.

The Master of the MALINSKA failed to use the radar to best advantage, failed to use parallel indexing or other radar monitoring method, and so was unaware that the ship was being set to the north.

The Master failed to fully assess the situation before altering course to starboard, placing undue reliance on the ARPA, mis-reading or mis-interpreting the distance to the collision point, and failing to check the ship's position.

When IRON CARPENTARIA altered course to 145 degrees to take the ship south of the recommended track, due to the strong tidal effect, a developing collision, or near collision, situation was created.

Even had MALINSKA not altered course to starboard and had maintained a heading of 232 degrees, because it had been set to the north, there was a strong possibility of the ship grounding on the bank south of the Burley Shoal.
The bridge procedures on board the MALINSKA were lax, in that there was no bridge management structure and no passage planning had been carried out.

Had the Mate been on the bridge for departure instead of, as more traditionally, on the forecastle the incident may have been approached with more awareness and possibly avoided.
Alcohol cannot be totally ruled out as a factor that might have affected the Master's judgement.

The Master of the IRON CARPENTARIA intended to keep clear of the MALINSKA, to give that ship priority.

The actions of the Master of the IRON CARPENTARIA were correct and not inappropriate.

Where an inbound vessel is to encounter an outbound vessel in the vicinity of "the gap", it would be appropriate for the inbound vessel to stand off, so as to allow the outbound vessel to clear "the gap", before making the final approach.
A navigation aid located either on Burley Shoal or on the northern side of "the gap" would have provided a visual reference for the Master, alerting him to the fact that the ship was being set to the north and that IRON CARPENTARIA was still to seaward of "the gap".

Before disembarking, the Harbour Master should have drawn the Master's attention to the northerly setting current and warned him of the danger of being set towards Burley Shoal.
Following discussions between the Australian Maritime Safety Authority and BHP, engendered by the findings of the investigation, a South Cardinal buoy is to be located on the 11.5m bank to the north of "the gap". It was anticipated that the buoy would be in position by May 1994.