2011X53 Grounding of CONCERT EXPRESS

Place du Centre, 4th Floor, 200 Promenade du Portage, Hull, Quebec. K1A 1K8
Telephone (819) 994-3741.

Refer to 7023offrep for the other report.

The vessel arrived at the Halifax Pilot Station (8 miles from the point of grounding) at 0630 after an uneventful voyage. All mechanical, electrical and navigational systems were operating satisfactorily, except the course recorder which was unserviceable. The visibility at the time was approximately 100M and the vessel was navigated by radar. On the bridge were the pilot, the master, the second mate (2/O), a helmsman and a lookout/standby helmsman. RT communications were maintained with Halifax VTS and it was established that the only other traffic moving was the Halifax to Dartmouth Ferry and one vessel manoeuvring off a berth on the Halifax shore. One vessel was anchored in the designated area midway between Georges Island and the Dartmouth shore.

There were three radars fitted with daylight viewing screens, two of these were ARPAs. The ARPA being used by the pilot was set in the "north-up, relative motion" mode and the "own ship off-set" facility was in use. The Heading Marker (HM) was displayed as a solid line, the Electronic Bearing Marker (EBL) as a dashed line and a vector displaying "own ship" course and speed could be superimposed on to the HM. Two modes of vector operation were possible, standard and variable, if the variable mode was in use the vector could be quite long and possibly extend the entire length of the HM. The standard mode had been previously in use and had been left on. It is not certain whether the variable mode had been accidentally switched on.

As there is no routing system in the harbour, the most appropriate route is normally decided between the pilot and the master and may be prompted by information supplied by the VTS. After boarding, harbour traffic and the proper identification of radar targets, principally buoys ahead, was discussed by the pilot and the master but no detailed discussion regarding the planned route. On this occasion, the pilot decided to pass to the east of Georges Island but the master was not made aware of the pilots intention to pass between the anchored vessel and the Dartmouth shore.

As the pilotage progressed, the pilot reduced the range of the radar he was using from 6 miles to 3, then to 1.5 miles and finally, to 0.75 mile range. The master monitored the pilot's orders to the helmsman, effected the engine speed requests and re-adjusted the "off-set" modes on the radars as required while alternatively viewing the port and starboard radars. The 2/O monitored the actions of the helmsman as he responded to the pilot's orders and periodically plotted the vessel's position on the chart but he did not maintain a systematic blind pilotage regime.

Both the pilot and the master were aware of the anchored vessel. The master believed the pilot's intention was to pass west of the anchored vessel, as this would not require a large alteration of course, the master off-set the ship's position on the radar for what he believed would be subsequent changes. The CONCERT EXPRESS was steering 3450T and when it was 0.75 miles off the anchored ship, the pilot decided to pass to the east, i.e. between the anchored ship and the Dartmouh shore.

The EBL was placed to the east of the anchored vessel's radar target, which the pilot believed required a course alteration of 330 to starboard. At 0704 the helm was put 20 degrees to starboard, the intent of the pilot was to align the HM with the EBL and then to steer a new course of 0180T. At 0705 the pilot advised the VTS of the ship's position, a few seconds later, having observed the course alteration by radar, the VTS asked if the intention was to pass east of the anchored vessel, the pilot affirmed this.

The vessel's radar was only intermittently monitored during these two transmissions which occurred during a critical period of 13 seconds, and while the vessel's approximate speed was 10 to 11 knots. During the transmissions, the vessel had turned to such an extent that the HM had passed the EBL. It is possible that the EBL was then mistaken by the pilot for the HM which led him to the momentary belief that the vessel had steadied on the new course of 0180. In fact, the starboard helm was in effect until the vessel's head was 0710T and directly towards the shore. Immediate action of helm hard-to-port and "full ahead" on the engines was not sufficient to prevent the vessel grounding at 0709 and whilst doing 8 knots.

The conclusions reached on this incident highlighted the lack of communication between the pilot and the master and the fact that a large vessel was proceeding in confined waters with visibility of 100m with no blind pilotage organisation in effect. With the speed vector superimposed over the heading marker, there is also the possibility that the pilot mistook the heading marker for the EBL, radar manufacturers may like to consider this when designing new sets and try to make the HM and EBL as visually distinctive as possible. Although the report does not mention it, a radar range of 0.75 miles when proceeding at 10 knots is totally inappropriate. See 7023offrep