96011 Near Miss Crossing TSS SINGAPORE
Near Miss Singapore Strait
Report No. 96011
The target vessel was a westbound tanker of about 80 to 90,000 tonnes inballast, she was not displaying deep draught signals and her name and callsign are not known. There was no information from Singapore radio regardingdeep draft vessels passing through Malacca Strait. Own vessel was a multipurpose cargo vessel of 11900 grt.
2226 Stop engines
2233.5 Half Ahead
2235 Pilot away at southern boarding ground
2236 Full Ahead
2240 Half Ahead, course 125 deg, crossing the west bound lane at almostright angles to the separation scheme. Target vessel's green light and mastheadlights clearly visible about 4 points on the port bow at 1.7 nm. Tried toraise vessel on the Aldis lamp and VHF but no response.
2242 We gave 5 short blasts on the whistle and repeated several times.No response from the target vessel. Emergency stations called
2242.5 Hard a starboard and 1 short blast on the whistle, Stop engine.
2244 Target vessel seen to be altering to her port and also flashing morselight from radar mast. Half ahead.
2246 Heard 2 short blasts (very weak) from the target vessel.
We subsequently passed stern to stern about 50m clearance. Own vessel'shelm was put to midship then hard a port after observing that target vesselwas continuing to turn to port. However before we started to swing to portthe target vessel was observed to be turning back to her starboard. Ownvessel turned back to starboard and the target vessel was told on the VHFto maintain her course and that we would pass under her stern. This timea very weak and distorted voice answered in the affirmative.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Target vessel did not see us crossing from her starboard until weflashed the Aldis and gave 5 short blasts
2. Clearly no appreciation of the crossing rule
3. doubt if target's bridge was adequately manned
4. Target vessels alteration to port was too slow
only one steering motor running?
altering on autopilot?
5. Target vessel's sound signal very weak and in any case too late tobe of any use
6. No response to our calling on Aldis and on VHF CH 10 and 16
7. VTIS East was informed about close quarter situation after own vesselclear and back on an easterly course. We requested the name of the othervessel but VTIS replied that this information was not available for us andthat we could write to the Port Master Singapore and he would reply.
8. It is likely that VTIS East must be trying to raise us on the VHFat the time of the near miss. However, at that time it was more importantto avoid an accident than to respond to a third party on VHF. It is alsoto be noted that we did not actually hear VTIS calling.
9. It could be argued that if we had completely stopped the ship andlet the other vessel pass ahead of us this close quarter situation wouldnot have occurred. In my view, had we tried to stop completely we wouldhave been a sitting duck, very close to the path of the other vessel andthat a collision would then be imminent if the other vessel had tried toalter course to starboard and pass astern of us as we had expected in thiscrossing situation. Also the current was setting to the east at about 2to 3 knots and we would have further closed onto the other vessel with noheadway.
10. The back scatter of shore lights and anchored vessels prevented usfrom clearly sighting this vessel earlier. In this regard the requirementof an ARPA cannot be over emphasised. A manual plotter in such dense trafficis of no practical use at all.
11. It is suggested that pilots should board at the eastern boardingground Alpha and disembark at the western boarding ground. The accidentprone southern boarding ground should be avoided and no crossing of TSSlanes should be done in this area.
Editor
In this case it ay have been more prudent to proceed eastwrads along the Southern Fairway while building up speed or waiting for a clear opportunity to cross the westbound lane. Vessels should proceed d=from an anchorage or pilot boarding ground with extreme caution and avoid obstructing other traffic. See also 96010