201043 Collision with motor yacht

Collision with motor yacht
MARS Report 201043

A product tanker had just sailed from port and was increasing to full sea speed. At 18:32 hrs, in clear visibility and good weather, the vessel was steering 031°T at a speed of 16 knots. At 18:40, the AB on lookout reported a red light on the starboard bow. The third officer determined the visual bearing to be 072°T and estimated the target to be about five nm away, but could not see it on the radar. The visual bearing was checked a few minutes later and was found to be 074°T but the target was still not detected on the radar. No further visual bearings were taken. The third officer's evaluation was that he would pass ahead of the other vessel. He also presumed that the other vessel was either a small pleasure craft or a fishing vessel and would keep clear of own vessel on its own accord.

At 19:00, in anticipation of a manoeuvre to avoid collision, the third officer placed the duty AB on manual steering. At some stage between 19:00 and 19:15 the third officer observed that the distance to the other vessel appeared to be rapidly decreasing. The Aldis lamp was directed at the other vessel but no response was obtained. Finally, at 19:15, hard port rudder was ordered, and a few seconds later, the vessels (other vessel identified as a motor yacht) collided. A glancing contact was made between the yacht's port bow and the starboard quarter of the tanker. All available evidence suggests that no avoiding actions were taken by the yacht and no lookout was being maintained by her prior to the collision. A playback of the tanker's VDR data showed that the target was being displayed intermittently on her radar.

Root cause/contributory factors
1. Failure to observe Colregs, particularly Rules 5 (Lookout), 7 (Risk of collision) and 8 (Action to avoid collision);
2. No action taken to avoid a close quarter situation;
3. Action to avoid collision insufficient and not taken in good time;
4. Improper setting of radar controls that caused over-suppression of target echoes;
5. Inadequate monitoring of the radar and failure to check for targets along the heading line or change the display to a more appropriate range when closing with the yacht;
6. No use was made of the whistle to attract the attention of the other vessel;
7. The master was not called by the OOW who was in doubt about a developing close quarter situation and efficiency of critical equipment (radar);
8. An incorrect assumption was made that smaller vessels would keep clear of larger vessels.

Recommendations
1. All vessels in the fleet to discuss the above incident at their next safety meeting;
2. All bridge watch keepers must at all times comply with Colregs, and demonstrate a clear understanding of Rules 5, 7 and 8;
3. OOW must use all available equipment and controls and must not hesitate to use the whistle when needed;
4. OOW must not hesitate to call the master;
5. Prior to taking over watch, OOW must ensure that the radar has been properly setup and is performing as per requirements;
6. Increased frequency of internal and external audits of navigation operations and systems on all vessels;
7. OOW must avoid making assumptions on scanty information.