200957 Collision in TSS

Collision in TSS
MARS Report 200957

Official report; edited from MAIB accident flyer 5/2009

A general cargo vessel was on passage from the Thames estuary to Antwerp. She was crossing the NE traffic lane of the Dover Strait TSS when she was in collision with a bulk carrier which was heading NE in the Sandettie deep water route. No lookout was posted on either bridge at the time of the collision. The vessels both had fully operational radars, fitted with Automatic Radar Plotting Aids (ARPA), although no radar targets had been acquired by either vessel before the collision. The general cargo vessel was the give-way vessel, but, on a clear, dark night with good visibility, neither vessel saw the other until moments before the collision. The watchkeeping officer on the bulk carrier, after seeing the other vessel very close to port, put the helm hard to starboard just before the collision occurred.

A fuel tank was breached on the general cargo vessel, causing pollution, while the damage to the bulk carrier, although less severe, took more than a week to repair on arrival at her next port.

Root cause/contributory factors
The lookouts on both vessels were allowed to leave the bridge in an area of high navigational risk.
In the absence of a dedicated lookout, neither OOW made best use of the available navigational aids (radar, AIS) visually to maintain an effective appreciation of the traffic situation.
The bulk carrier, despite having a draught of less than six metres, was using a deep-water route, which is meant for vessels with a draught of 16 m or more.
Although neither master was on the bridge, standing/night orders were not used to alert the watchkeepers to the risks they were likely to encounter during their bridge watch.
There was no encouragement for the lookout to become an integral part of the bridge team of either vessel.
Lessons learnt
Complacency continues to be a recurring safety issue in accidents investigated by the MAIB. Shipowners should recognise the risks posed by complacency and ensure that their vessels operate with effective bridge teams at all times.
Masters should make best use of standing/night orders to set operational benchmarks and heighten bridge watchkeepers' awareness of risk when appropriate.
Masters must lead by example. Ships' crews are unlikely to apply the high professional standards demanded if these are not observed by the officer in overall command.
The use of designated lookouts is an essential requirement for safe navigation, but continues to be regarded as a low priority on some vessels.
The use of navigational aids is not a substitute for maintaining a visual lookout.